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Abstract

In the United States, industrial and terrorist use of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials pose a risk to public safety. During the
initial phase of typical CBRN incidents, emergency responders establish hazard zones
based on standard distances from published guidelines and recommendations. This
research investigates how standard hazard zones change in a real world environment that
accounts for physical boundaries. Using a python simulation in ArcGIS®, new hazard
zones were created by expanding standard hazard zones to follow nearby roads, railroads,
and rivers. The new and standard zones were compared by calculating the population
and area affected by each zone. Additionally, responder efficiency was compared across
different combinations of physical boundaries. The simulation generated 990 random
points across three cities and three environments (urban, suburban, rural) and was
replicated for six hazards. The results revealed significantly larger populations and areas
affected by new zones compared to standard zones and significant effects from the
environment and city where the incident occurred. Depending on hazard, the median
growth ranged from approximately 340 to 8,000 people and 0.6 to 8.8 square miles. The
particular combination of physical boundaries used in creating hazard zones was not
found to influence responder efficiency.
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A SIMULATION-BASED ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL
HAZARD ZONES ADAPTED TO PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES

I. Introduction
Background
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE)
incidents have posed a threat to the public’s safety for centuries. A large range of
industries across the United States currently use toxic industrial chemicals and materials
(TIC/TIMs). Over 20,000 facilities release or dispose of toxic chemicals as part of their
normal operations every year (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2015). As
might be expected, spills and accidental releases are common. In 2014, the National
Response Center tracked reports of more than 30,000 chemical incidents and over 1,100
fatalities (U.S. Coast Guard, 2015). Nuclear power plants have raised more recent
concerns about accidents releasing radioactive material. The first nuclear power plant in
the United States began operating in 1957, and today there are 99 nuclear power reactors
in operation at 62 locations (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2015). Widely
considered the most serious nuclear accident in U.S. history, Three Mile Island
experienced a partial meltdown in 1979. While only a voluntary evacuation notice was
issued, it is estimated that 144,000 people evacuated the area (Stallings, 1984).
Hazardous chemical and biological agents have also been used intentionally as weapons
1

for millennia; ancient Chinese and Greek writings describe acts of war involving
contaminated water supplies and toxic sulfur fumes (Chauhan, 2008). Chemical
weapons, while not new, were first used on a large scale in World War I (Szinicz, 2005).
Nuclear weapons and radiological dispersal devices have posed more recent threats
regarding radiological fallout. A small nuclear attack in a city could impact thousands of
square kilometers and hundreds of thousands of people (Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), 2008). In the last century, this threat has grown considerably, and
terrorism has expanded the concern of intentional releases beyond the battlefield.
Current Response Guidelines
In the United States, local, state, and national government agencies need to be
prepared to respond to a CBRNE incident in many types of environments. Several
federal agencies, such as the EPA, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and
FEMA, have worked to establish response guidelines. For example, the U.S. DOT,
Transport Canada, and Secretariat for Communications and Transportation (2012) have
published documents discussing the zones that should be evacuated or cordoned off for
transportation accidents, FEMA has provided recommendations for the evacuation vs.
shelter-in-place decision for airborne hazardous materials accidents (Buddemeier,
Valentine, Millage, & Brandt, 2011), and the EPA (2013) has researched radiation dose
limits to provide protection from adverse health effects. Additionally, much research has
been done to refine these recommendations, better understand the hazards involved, and
propose new response strategies (cf. Dillon, 2014; Sorenson, 2004; Chakrabarti & Parikh,
2013; Wein, 2010; Lindell, 2000; EPA, 2013; Glickman & Ujihara, 1990).
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There are accepted standards and guidelines for responding to many types of
CBRNE incidents. These guidelines include procedures for setting up hazard zones at
defined distances around the incident or plume during the initial phase (i.e. typically
about the first 30 minutes) of the response (Chakrabarti & Parikh, 2013). A widely used
reference in North America is the DOT’s Emergency Response Guidebook (2012), which
recommends initial isolation and protective action distances for different chemicals and
situations. The initial isolation zone is the area directly around the incident within which
the concentration is expected to be lethal or dangerous and is restricted to emergency
responders wearing appropriate protective equipment. The protective action zone is the
area in the downwind direction within which the concentration is expected to cause
debilitating or serious injury. Typically, responders would direct evacuation or shelterin-place within the protective action zone. However, in practice, responders must deal
with the physical boundaries of the environment at the incident site, such as roads,
buildings, railroads, forests, and rivers. Little research has been done to quantify the
effect of physical boundaries on hazard zones. Some responders might set up a cordon
that matches as closely as possible to the recommended distances without specific
consideration for physical boundaries, whereas other responders might try to conform to
nearby natural and infrastructure boundaries.
Additionally, the effects of the physical environment on a hazard or evacuation
zone might change from one location to another. For example, an urban location has
more man-made boundaries, such as roads, buildings, and utilities, whereas a rural
environment typically has more natural boundaries, such as rivers, hills, and woodlands.
While a CBRNE incident is unlikely in a location with no man-made infrastructure, an
3

incident can occur in areas with substantial infrastructure or with very little infrastructure.
For example, a truck transporting hazardous materials on a small highway in the middle
of Wyoming and a dirty bomb in downtown New York City are both plausible scenarios.
Because population density varies among environments, the incident environment has a
significant impact on the number of people evacuated or otherwise affected by an
incident. The available physical boundaries might also affect responder efficiency in
establishing cordons. For example, a cordon that requires more road blocks will take
longer to establish and more manpower to maintain.
Many guidelines are based on “bright lines,” or the idea that there is a specific
threshold under which no adverse effects are expected. However, in reality, these
thresholds contain a good deal of uncertainty. In some incidents, the bright line might be
insufficient to protect the public, and in many incidents, the bright line might be more
conservative than necessary (Thompson, 2002), contributing to uncertainty in the
standard distances at which to establish cordons. Bright lines also might not be publicly
accepted. If buildings on one side of a street are evacuated, but the other side is deemed
safe, people might resist evacuating or decide to self-evacuate, which can aggravate
transportation networks and place additional demands on emergency responders and mass
care resources.
Historical Example
On 6 January 2005, a train carrying hazardous materials collided with another
train in Graniteville, South Carolina. Several of the cars derailed, including three
containing chlorine. One of the railcars was punctured and released approximately 60
tons of chlorine. The release resulted in 9 deaths, 554 respiratory complaints, and 75
4

hospital admissions. About 5,400 people were evacuated within a one-mile radius for the
next several days while responders contained the site and removed the hazardous
materials.
The conditions at the time of the incident (2:39 am) included moderate winds at 7
mph from the south-southwest and clear skies (NTSB, 2005). Under these conditions for
a rail car spill, the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) recommends a 3,000foot initial isolation zone and at least 7-mile protective action zone in the downwind
direction (DOT et al., 2012). The 2004 ERG, which was current at the time of the
Graniteville incident and did not include detailed recommendations for wind speeds or
type of spill, recommended an 800-foot initial isolation zone and 4.6-mile protective
action zone (DOT et al., 2004). However, the emergency responders set up hazard zones
and protective actions using different distances. Within 10 minutes of the accident, the
fire chief directed that residents be notified to shelter in place. Within 20 minutes,
approach roads were blocked to restrict traffic within a radius of about one mile. The
sheriff’s office later ordered an evacuation of residents within a one-mile radius and
implemented an almost 1,000-foot zone around the accident site where only personnel
wearing personal protective equipment were allowed access (NTSB, 2005).
Additionally, a curfew was implemented for residents between one and two miles from
the accident (Mitchell at al., 2005).
A survey conducted shortly after the accident found that there was some
confusion among residents regarding the evacuation order. Almost all residents who
lived within one mile evacuated, but about 59% of residents between one and two miles
also decided to evacuate. Many of these residents thought the evacuation order applied to
5

them, some were unsure, and some decided to evacuate even though they understood the
order did not apply to them. Several residents indicated that they were unclear about the
exact boundaries and would have liked to see street names demarking the boundaries on
the maps shown on the news (Mitchell et al., 2005). The evacuation behavior during this
incident illustrates the challenge faced by responders and community officials when they
implement hazard zones in a real world environment, namely determining and clearly
communicating the precise boundaries of the zones.
Hazards
FEMA categorizes hazards as natural, technological, or human-caused. While
natural disasters can trigger CBRNE accidents (Burdick, 2005), technological or humancaused hazards are more likely to directly cause a CBRNE incident. Every technological
system has the potential to fail and cause an accident. Thousands of TIC/TIMs are used
in various industrial processes across the country, which could accidentally release a
hazardous substance. Some TIC/TIMs pose a particular risk to inhalation and are
referred to as Toxic Inhalation Hazards (TIHs). The DOT et al. have identified six TIHs
that are more commonly encountered in accidental releases (DOT et al., 2012), three of
which are studied in this research. Human-caused hazards include chemical and
biological agents used as weapons, nuclear weapons, and radiological dispersal devices
(RDDs). Chemical agents are further categorized as nerve, blister, choking, and blood
agents. Nerve agents are especially toxic and fast-acting. RDDs are of particular concern
as a terrorist threat. This research considers two nerve agents and one RDD of unknown
size, material, and geometry.

6

Problem Statement
The purpose of this research is to investigate and characterize initial emergency
hazard zones for CBRNE incidents in a real world scenario by accounting for the
physical environment.

Research Questions
The following three research questions were investigated:
1. How do published emergency hazard zones for various CBRNE incidents
change when adapted to physical boundaries?
2. What effects do different environments and locations have on emergency
hazard zones when the zones are adapted to physical boundaries?
3. Is there a preferred set of physical boundaries that improves responder
efficiency?

Methodology
The methodology employed in this research consisted of selecting incident
locations to use for case studies, developing a model with ESRI’s ArcGIS® 10.2
software (2014) to generate hazard zones and population data, and performing statistical
analysis to compare the standard zones to the zones considering physical boundaries.
Hazard and Location Selection
Three TIC/TIM hazards (anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, and sulfur dioxide), two
chemical warfare hazards (VX and sarin), and one radiological hazard (radiological
dispersal device) were selected for analysis. Standard hazard distance guidelines from
the Emergency Response Guidebook were determined for the TIC/TIM and chemical
7

warfare hazards. Standard hazard zone distances were determined for radiological
dispersal devices from Sandia National Laboratory experiments (Musolino, Harper,
Buddemeier, Brown, & Schlueck, 2013). Three areas within the United States (Chicago,
Denver, and Houston) were chosen to reflect areas where releases are relatively common.
Three locations within each metropolitan area were further selected to consider the
impact of urban, suburban, and rural environments.
ArcGIS® Model
Geospatial analysis was used to generate standard cordons and evaluate their
impacts on population and area. An algorithm was developed to adjust the standard
cordons to match boundaries in the physical environment, and geospatial analysis was
again used to evaluate the new impacts on population and area. The physical boundaries
selected were roads, railroads, and rivers. Hazard distances were not allowed to decrease,
so the resulting hazard zones covered an equal or greater total area to prevent accepting
additional risk to the population. As a measure of responder efficiency, the number of
intersections in the new hazard zones using four different combinations of physical
boundaries was also counted and compared to the standard zones. These intersections
represent locations where responders might have to block traffic and serve as a proxy
variable for the complexity of the zones.
Statistical Analysis
Each of the 6 hazards was modeled in each of the 9 locations, resulting in 54
scenarios. Each scenario was repeated 110 times by randomly generating specific release
sites within a defined region. In total, 5,940 observations were generated in this
investigation. Data representing the area and population affected by the hazard zones
8

were collected for each iteration. Additionally, the number of hazard zone intersections
was used as a proxy variable to measure responder efficiency. Paired t-tests, confidence
intervals, ANOVAs, and a select-the-best procedure were used to compare the paired
scenarios based on the collected data.

Assumptions/Limitations
One significant limitation of this study is that responders respond differently; in
other words, the same scenario could lead to different decisions regarding cordon set-up.
This bias may be influenced by multiple factors including experience and available
resources. Additionally, this research only looked at three locations and only considered
six hazards or threats in certain meteorological conditions. The ERG is mostly used for
accidental releases, so worst-case scenarios involving intentional or catastrophic releases
of TIC/TIMs may require larger distances. The section of the ERG used in this research
is also limited to airborne hazards and does not consider the effects of contamination that
may spread along the ground or by water. Further, there may be other elements of the
physical environment that influence hazard boundaries that were not included in this
study, such as hills or low-lying areas, property boundaries, jurisdictional designations,
and woodlands. Finally, the estimated populations affected by the hazard zones relied on
U.S. Census Bureau’s census block data. Thus, the populations were estimated from
places of residence and will not always reflect the actual presence of people during an
incident in an area, as people work, shop, and travel to different places.
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Implications
Currently, responders operate with initial hazard zone recommendations that do
not explicitly account for the physical environment. Responders generally rely on
judgement and personal experience to apply the recommendations to the real world
incident. Many characteristics of a specific scenario can vary, such as population density,
environment, road networks, and city. The implications of the process of setting up real
world hazard zones from general recommendations are largely unknown. However,
understanding the extent of area and people affected by the real world application of
hazard zones is an important input for protective action and resource management
decisions. Additionally, researchers and community leaders who use simplified, generic
hazard zones during pre-planning to evaluate response protocols, evacuation decision
points, and hypothetical incident impacts to the population often rely on their results to
develop critical plans and tools and make resource decisions. It is imperative that they be
equipped with estimates that are as accurate as possible.

Preview
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter provided background
information and established the research questions. The second chapter will review
literature relevant to the research. The third chapter will describe the methodology
applied to the problem. The fourth chapter will explain the results of the analysis. The
final chapter will provide conclusions from the study and answer the research questions.

10

II. Literature Review
Introduction
Within the all-hazards framework, FEMA categorizes hazards into three types.
Natural hazards are caused by acts of nature, and while they could result in CBRN
releases, they are not directly considered in this research. Technological hazards are
caused by system failures. These include industrial chemical and nuclear power
accidents. An industrial chemical accident might involve the release of any hazardous
materials used for industrial purposes, commonly known as Toxic Industrial Chemicals
and Toxic Industrial Materials (TIC/TIM). A nuclear industry accident may involve the
release of radiological material. Finally, human-caused hazards are caused by intentional
acts. These include chemical, biological, and radiological agents intentionally released as
weapons, which would typically be considered an act of terrorism within the United
States. Once a hazardous material release occurs, response agencies must manage the
incident to control the hazard. This chapter will consider potential technological and
human-caused hazards. Additionally, typical incident response management protocols,
factors affecting the decision to evacuate or shelter-in-place, exposure guidelines, and
standard hazard zone determinations and recommendations will be addressed.

Technological Hazards – TIC/TIMs
A frequent technological hazard is the accidental release of industrial chemicals.
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) (2012) lists six chemical hazards that are
commonly encountered in accidental releases. These are anhydrous ammonia, chlorine,
11

ethylene oxide, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen fluoride, and sulfur dioxide. These six have
a “high” hazard index, indicating that the hazard is widely produced, transported, or
stored and has high toxicity and volatility (Fatah et al., 2001). While TIC/TIMs can be
intentionally released in an attack with the same physiological consequences, releases are
more commonly associated with accidents. To select industrial hazards for this research,
data from the National Response Center (U.S. Coast Guard, 2015), which tracks reports
of hazardous materials and oil spills, were analyzed. From 2012 to 2014, there were
2,501 ammonia releases, 593 sulfur dioxide releases, 302 chlorine releases, 54 ethylene
oxide releases, 30 hydrogen chloride releases, and less than 20 hydrogen fluoride
releases. As the most commonly released chemicals of the six toxic inhalation hazards
identified by the DOT, ammonia, sulfur dioxide, and chlorine were studied. These
chemicals provide a sufficient range of possible scenarios.
Anhydrous Ammonia
Ammonia is a chemical that is made up of nitrogen and hydrogen. In a purely
gaseous state with no water, it is called anhydrous ammonia. Ammonia has no color, but
does have a strong distinct odor. Ammonia is lighter than air, but if transported or stored
as compressed liquefied gas, an initial spill may result in a fog that stays low to the
ground. It is produced by both nature and manufacturing and is only dangerous in
concentrated forms. It is most commonly used in fertilizer, as well as cleaning solutions
and the manufacture of various products. In 2002, 10.8 million metric tons of ammonia
were manufactured in the United States at over 2,300 facilities, making it one of the most
highly produced chemicals in the country. More than half the ammonia production in the
United States occurs in Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas (ATSDR, 2004).
12

Exposure to anhydrous ammonia can occur through inhalation, ingestion, or skin
contact. It is primarily an upper respiratory irritant. Ammonia reacts with water to form
ammonium hydroxide, which is strongly alkaline and corrosive. Contact with
concentrated ammonia can cause severe burns to any tissue with moisture, such as the
lungs, eyes, and skin. Ammonia has a particularly strong affinity for damaging the eyes.
Severe exposures can lead to permanent injury, blindness, or death, which usually results
from pulmonary edema (Chemical Hazards Emergency Medical Management
(CHEMM), 2014). Ammonia is detectable by odor at around 5 ppm. At concentrations
above about 50 ppm, people will typically experience irritation in the nose and throat, and
at around 100 ppm, people will experience slight eye irritation. Most people can tolerate
concentrations of around 250 ppm for 30-60 minutes (ATSDR, 2004; Public Health
England, 2015). The immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH, discussed in detail
later in this chapter) concentration is 300 ppm (NIOSH, 2011).
Chlorine
Chlorine is a gas with a greenish-yellow color and strong odor. Chlorine is highly
reactive and unstable. Chlorine is heavier than air, so it tends to remain low to the
ground. It is usually transported as a liquid under pressure by tanker trucks or as a liquid
or gas through pipelines. In 2008, 10.6 million metric tons of chlorine were produced in
the United States. The primary uses of chlorine are in manufacturing of PVC plastics,
other organic compounds, and inorganic chemicals, as well as water treatment (ATSDR,
2010). In 1915 at Ypres, Belgium, chlorine was the first chemical to be used as a weapon
of mass destruction (Szinicz, 2005). Since then, more toxic chemicals have been
developed for use in war, but given the accessibility and prevalence of chlorine in
13

industrial applications, chlorine could be used for a domestic terror attack (Barrett &
Adams, 2011).
Exposure to chlorine gas can irritate the respiratory tract and eyes and affect
pulmonary function. Chlorine reacts with moisture in the cells of the respiratory tract and
other surfaces to produce hydrochloric acid and hypochlorous acid. The hypochlorous
acid decomposes to form oxygen free radicals, which are highly corrosive (Banks, 2014).
The IDLH concentration is 10 ppm, above which a person’s ability to escape may be
hampered (NIOSH, 2011). At a concentration of 15 ppm, most people experience
irritation in the nose, eyes, and throat. Chest pain and coughing occur at around 30 ppm.
Toxic pneumonitis and pulmonary edema occur at around 40-60 ppm. Death can be
expected after a few minutes of exposure at about 1,000 ppm. The duration of exposure
and the presence of respiratory conditions affect the symptoms and the concentrations at
which symptoms occur (ATSDR, 2010).
Sulfur Dioxide
Sulfur dioxide is a gas with a strong odor and no color that dissolves readily in
water and is heavier than air. Sulfur dioxide exists in the atmosphere as a result of fuel
combustion, industrial processes, and volcanic activity. Sulfur dioxide is commonly
produced commercially by burning elemental sulfur. Most commercial sulfur dioxide is
produced as part of the process of manufacturing sulfuric acid, wood pulp, and paper, as
well as smelting operations. It is also used in preservatives, refrigeration, bleach, and
other industrial processes. In 1985, 118,000 metric tons of sulfur dioxide were produced
(ATSDR, 1998).
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Exposure to sulfur dioxide can occur through inhalation, ingestion, or skin
contact. Like ammonia and chlorine, it primarily affects the respiratory system. Sulfur
dioxide reacts with water to form sulfites, which systemically travel through the blood.
Sulfites can be oxidized to sulfite oxidase in the liver and excreted through urine.
Inhalation of sulfur dioxide causes bronchoconstriction, leading to increased airway
resistance. Contact with sulfur dioxide can cause burns to any tissue with moisture, such
as the lungs, eyes, and skin. Severe exposures can lead to permanent injury or death
(ATSDR, 1998). Sulfur dioxide is detectable by odor at around 3 to 5 ppm. At
concentrations around 8 to 12 ppm, people will typically experience irritation in the eyes
and throat, and at around 50 ppm, people often experience severe irritation. The IDLH
concentration has been established at 100 ppm by NIOSH (2011). Concentrations around
400 to 500 ppm are considered immediately life-threatening (U. S. National Library of
Medicine (NLM), 2015).

Human-Caused Hazards
Human-caused CBRN attacks have historical precedence both as weapons of
mass destruction in warfare and as targeted terrorist attacks. In World War I, chemicals
were used extensively on the battlefield. The first use of a chemical agent as a weapon of
mass destruction was chlorine in 1915. Phosgene was first used later that year, is ten
times as toxic as chlorine, and had the highest mortality rate from chemical weapons in
World War I (Szinicz, 2005). Mustard gas was first used in 1917 and proved effective
against troops wearing protective masks, causing approximately 27,000 casualties before
the end of the war. Estimates vary, but approximately 1,000,000 casualties and 80,000
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fatalities resulted from chemical warfare agents in World War I (Joy, 1997). In World
War II, Japan used choking and blister agents, as well as biological agents, during the
invasion of China. While not used in war, Germany used blood agents in concentration
camps (Szinicz, 2005). Nuclear weapons were first used in warfare when the United
States detonated two atomic bombs over Japan in 1945. A 15 kiloton yield nuclear
weapon was detonated over Hiroshima, and a 21 kiloton yield nuclear weapon was
detonated over Nagasaki (Woodruff, Alt, Forcino, & Walker, 2012).
In recent decades, CBRN agents have also been involved in terrorist attacks. In
1995, a terrorist group in Tokyo released sarin in five subway cars on three lines during
rush hour, resulting in 11 deaths and over 5,000 casualties (Okumura, 1996). In 2001,
letters contaminated with anthrax spores infected 22 people and killed 5 (Bush & Perez,
2012). In 2014, an attack near Damascus, Syria involved sarin. Death toll estimates
range from about 350 to 1,500 (Pita & Domingo, 2014).
Chemical Agents
Chemical agents are categorized as nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents.
Each category is briefly discussed in this section. Due to their high toxicity, this research
will consider VX and GB (sarin). VX and sarin have substantially different properties.
VX is non-volatile and doesn’t boil until 298 degrees Celcius, contributing to its high
persistency in the environment. VX is highly toxic with an AEGL-1 (acute exposure
guideline level indicating the concentration above which non-disabling, temporary health
effects can be expected) at 10 minutes of 0.000052 ppm. Comparatively, sarin has a
volatility about 4 orders of magnitude greater than VX and a lower boiling point of 147
degrees Celcius, contributing to its lack of persistence in the environment. Sarin has a
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toxicity level about 100 times lower than VX with an AEGL-1 at 10 minutes of 0.012
ppm. These differences are also evident in the differing hazard distances discussed later
in this chapter.
Nerve Agents
Nerve agents are organophosphates that affect the nervous system. Exposure to
nerve agents is most commonly by inhalation, but can also occur through skin contact or
ingestion. Nerve agents include VX and G-series agents, such as sarin, tabun, and
soman. According to Szinicz (2005), “VX appears to be the most effective chemical
warfare agent ever produced.” A dose of approximately 0.3 mg by inhalation and a dose
of approximately 5 mg by dermal exposure are considered lethal (Szinicz, 2005). VX is
an oily liquid with a low volatility, so it has high persistence in the environment. Sarin
has a high volatility, so the liquid more quickly evaporates and dissipates from the
immediate environment.
Nerve agents act by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase from breaking down
acetylcholine. This results in an excess of acetylcholine at cholinergic terminals.
Acetylcholine is used more in the parasympathetic division than the sympathetic division,
so the parasympathetic system is affected to a greater degree. The muscles triggered by
acetylcholine cannot stop contracting, so they quickly fatigue, causing weakness, failure,
and eventual paralysis. Clinical manifestations include miosis, eye pain, chest tightness,
muscle weakness, nausea/vomiting, coughing, shortness of breath, loss of consciousness,
paralysis, and tachycardia. Fatigue of vital organs, such as the lungs, leads to death.
These effects can be seen within minutes after inhalation and within a few hours after
contact with the liquid (Burke, 2003; Weinbroum, 2005).
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Blister agents
Blister agents are chemicals that burn tissue and cause blistering. Exposure
occurs through contact with skin or mucous membranes. Blister agents commonly
include sulfur mustard and lewisite. Mustard is an oily substance with an odor of
mustard or garlic, is heavier than air, and has low volatility. Lewisite is a colorless liquid
with a metallic taste and is less stable than mustard (Ganesan, Raza, & Vijayaraghavan,
2010). These agents have low fatality rates estimated at 2-5%, but high morbidity rates.
In World War I, mustard made up the greatest portion of chemical weapon casualties at
about 70%, but only a small portion of deaths (Chauhan et al., 2008).
Mustard acts by degrading DNA, protein, and other molecules, which effectively
inhibits protein synthesis and kills the cells. Fast dividing cells, such as epithelial and
bone marrow cells, are most affected. At lower severity, clinical manifestations include
eye itching and burning, coughing, and skin reddening. At higher severity, clinical
manifestations include vesication, skin necrosis, corneal inflammation and scarring,
sloughing of airway mucosa, and shortness of breath. In the case of mustard, effects are
typically delayed a few hours after exposure, whereas the effects of lewisite occur almost
immediately (Ganesan, Raza, & Vijayaraghavan, 2010). Lewisite is also a systemic toxin
and can cause symptoms such as pulmonary edema, low blood pressure, and weakness
(Burke, 2003). Mustard can reduce blood cells counts 5-10 days after exposure. Early
fatalities usually result from laryngospasm, fatalities within a few days are usually caused
by secondary pneumonia, and delayed fatalities are usually caused by bone marrow
suppression (Chauhan et al., 2008).
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Choking agents
Choking agents are chemicals that damage the lungs and respiratory tract. They
react with moisture to create corrosive compounds that damage lung tissue and can cause
death by pulmonary edema. Exposure can occur through inhalation, skin contact, and
ingestion. Choking agents that have been historically weaponized include chlorine,
phosgene, and diphosgene. Chlorine is a greenish-yellow gas, phosgene is a white gas,
and both are heavier than air (McCafferty & Lennarson, 2002). Approximately 80% of
chemical weapon fatalities in World War I were due to phosgene (Ganesan, Raza, &
Vijayaraghavan, 2010).
Choking agents react with water to form acidic or basic compounds. Chlorine
forms hydrochloric acid and oxygen free radicals, whereas phosgene forms hydrochloric
acid and carbonyl (Cashman, 2008). As noted under chlorine earlier, clinical
manifestations include eye irritation, coughing, chest pain, shortness of breath, and
pulmonary edema. While effects from chlorine can be evident within minutes of
exposure, effects from phosgene may be delayed several hours. Clinical manifestations
are similar and include shortness of breath, bradycardia, hypotension, nausea, and
pulmonary edema (Ganesan, Raza, & Vijayaraghavan, 2010). Phosgene has an odor of
freshly mown hay, but the concentration at which the odor is detectable is several times
higher than the permissible exposure level.
Blood agents
Blood agents are chemicals that cause chemical asphyxiation by inhibiting the
blood’s ability to transport or use oxygen. Blood agents are volatile liquids or gases and
are thus non-persistent (Burke, 2003). Blood agents include nitrites, carbon monoxide,
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hydrogen cyanide, and hydrogen sulfide. While the least toxic of the chemical warfare
agents, the effects of blood agents occur within seconds to minutes. Several blood agents
were first used as industrial chemicals before being applied as weapons (Ganesan, Raza,
& Vijayaraghavan, 2010). France used hydrogen cyanide in World War I, but its high
evaporation rate made it less effective. It has been used in both Germany and Iraq for
extermination (Chauhan et al., 2008).
Cyanide binds to ferric iron in the blood and prevents electron transport at the
cellular level. This also causes acidic blood levels as anaerobic respiration is used and
lactic acid builds (Ganesan, Raza, & Vijayaraghavan, 2010). Clinical manifestations at
lower severity levels include nausea and vomiting, blurred vision, shortness of breath,
headache, and palpitations. At high concentrations, clinical manifestations include bright
red skin, metabolic acidosis, rapid breathing followed by no breathing, loss of
consciousness, and cardiac arrest (Chauhan et al., 2008).
Radiological Threats
Concern about unintentional radiological releases is often related to the nuclear
power industry. Intentional releases might be in the form of a nuclear weapon or
radiological dispersal device (RDD), which pose the same radiological threats as nuclear
power accidents, though nuclear weapons and RDDs also pose an explosive hazard. This
research will include the radiological hazard by considering RDDs.
Exposure to radiological hazards can occur through direct exposure, inhalation,
and deposition. Direct exposure occurs through contact with the atmospheric plume of
radioactive materials. Inhalation of radionuclides can occur from a plume or from
ground-deposited material. Deposition allows radioactive materials to continue emitting
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radiation after the plume has passed, referred to as groundshine. Groundshine can cause
significant long-term exposure hazards (EPA, 2013).
Ionizing radiation has sufficient energy to cause damage to cells. Ionizing
radiation comes in several forms, including alpha, beta, gamma, x-ray, and neutron.
Alpha particles are positively charged and comprised of two protons and two neutrons.
They are relatively large and impart high energy levels over a short distance, which can
cause significant damage to the DNA within cells by breaking DNA strands. Alpha
particles are easily stopped by thin barriers, such as paper or the outer layer of skin, and
only travel about three or four inches before interacting with matter. However, alpha
particles can still cause damage if inhaled. Beta particles are negatively charged and
made of electrons. They are somewhat smaller with lower energy and travel farther than
alpha particles. Beta particles cause less direct damage, but can still break DNA strands.
They can penetrate skin and travel up to about one hundred feet, but can be stopped by a
layer of clothing, although direct contact with skin can cause beta burns. Gamma
radiation consists of photons with no mass that travel at the speed of light. Gamma
radiation has less potential to cause damage, but can penetrate almost anything with
sufficient time. Several feet of concrete or several inches of lead are needed to stop
gamma rays (Burke, 2003). Gamma radiation causes damage to cells indirectly by
knocking apart water molecules, which creates free radicals that affect DNA in other cells
(Woodruff et al., 2012). X-rays are not likely to be used in a RDD, but if encountered,
they are similar to gamma radiation differing only in their point of origin. Neutrons are
uncharged particles and result from splitting atoms, such as a nuclear reactor, accelerator,
or detonation (Burke, 2003). Neutrons can cause whole body irradiation and react with
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nuclei in target cells, which can cause significant damage to the atomic structure (U.S.
Department of the Army, 1996).
Cells have the ability to repair damaged DNA. However, certain types of
damage, such as double strand breaks, are more likely to result in errors during the repair
process, and repair takes time. Significant damage caused by sufficiently large doses of
radiation can overwhelm the cell’s repair mechanisms (Woodruff et al., 2012). When
DNA is effectively changed by these mutations, cells can exhibit chromosomal
abnormalities and deletions (Tubiana, Feinendegen, Yang, & Kaminski, 2009). This can
lead to significant health problems over time, such as cancer and hereditary effects
(Woodruff et al., 2012).
U.S. radiological standards use a linear no-threshold theory to model dose
relationship to cancer (National Research Council, 2006). This assumes that cancer
resulting from radiation exposure is a stochastic response, such that any dose, even a low
dose, can cause cancer. Based on data suggesting a linear relationship at high doses, the
theory assumes that any increase in dose increases the cancer risk linearly. However,
several other theories model low dose response relationships differently and call the
accuracy of the linear no-threshold (LNT) theory into question (Harbron, 2012; Pollycove
& Feinendegen, 1999; Tubiana et al., 2009). The National Research Council’s (2006)
Biologic Effects of Ionizing Radiation VII report rejects these theories based on their
review of the evidence.
There are several measures of radiation exposure. A curie is a unit used to
measure the physical amount of radioactive material. A roentgen is a measure of the
amount of ionization produced by a specific material. A rad or gray is a unit of measure
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for the dose absorbed by the specific tissue. Finally, a rem or sievert is used to measure
the biological effect of the radiation dose on the target tissue (Burke, 2003; Mettler &
Voelz, 2002). Fast-dividing cells, such as bone marrow, experience higher damage,
because the cells don’t have as much time to repair the DNA. The National Research
Council (2006) estimates risks for various types of cancer in different demographics. For
example, cancer risk depends on factors such as total dose, dose-rate of exposure, organ
or tissue targeted, sex, age of exposure, and nationality, and there is considerable
uncertainty in the estimates. For an overall approximate estimate of lifetime cancer risk
from radiation exposure, the International Commission on Radiological Protection
estimates that risk increases by 0.055 for every sievert of radiation (Wrixon, 2008).
Radiological hazards also have short-term effects. Acute radiation syndrome
occurs at an effective dose of approximately 100 rem and has four phases: prodrome,
latent, manifest illness, and recovery. The specific effects depend on dose. The
prodrome phase occurs within the first 48-72 hours after exposure. Clinical
manifestations include nausea/vomiting, diarrhea, dehydration, fever, and fatigue; the
effects of nausea are generally not felt until a dosage exceeds 50 rem (NLM, 2015;
Woodruff et al., 2012; Goans & Flynn, 2012). At a dose of 200-250 rem, everyone can
expect to experience symptoms of illness, and some people will die within 30 days. A
dose of 500 rem is considered fatal to half the exposed population within 30 days (Burke,
2003). The latent phase lasts for 1-2.5 weeks after the prodrome phase. Clinical
manifestations are not prevalent, but leukocytes are decreasing. The manifest illness
phase is obvious illness occurs after the latent period. Clinical manifestations depend on
the specific organs damaged. The recovery phase can take weeks or months and, if the
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exposure was severe enough, may result in death (NLM, 2015; Woodruff et al., 2012;
Goans & Flynn, 2012).

Incident Scene Management
Having considered technological and human-caused hazards, this section will
consider response protocols. When emergency responders arrive on the scene of a CBRN
incident, they will have to make various decisions and judgement calls on how best to
manage the incident. Because of this, not every incident, even if the scenario was
identical, will involve the same response. However, there are basic principles and
procedures common to most incidents and response guidelines. This section will discuss
some of those procedures, as well as a few factors that may affect a response effort.
Initial Phase of Response
While the specific response actions may vary, NATO (n.d.), EPA (1994), NLM
(2015), OnGUARD (1996), Garcia, Rand, and Rinard (2011), Cashman (2008), and
Lesak (1999) identify some factors important during the initial phase of response for
most incidents. NATO defines the initial phase as the first 20 minutes of response. The
DOT indicates that the initial phase lasts until technically qualified personnel, such as a
HAZMAT response team, are available. The Emergency Response Guidebook (DOT et
al., 2012) is designed to be used by first responders during this initial phase of response.
Priorities during any incident include life-saving, protection of property, and protection
of the environment. In this case, the incident must first be recognized as involving a
CBRN hazard. Responders should gather information before and as they arrive on-scene,
noting indicators of CBRN incidents and possible threats. Responders should look for
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any information that identifies the hazard (NATO, n.d.; NLM, 2015). This process of
information gathering is sometimes referred to as size-up. Incident size-up is the process
of evaluating visual indicators of the incident, using training and experience to interpret
the information, and drawing conclusions to develop an action plan (Schnepp, 2010).
The EPA (1994) recommends gathering information related to the date and time of
release, risk to the surrounding public and property, terrain, weather, types of containers,
and whether the release was into the air, water, or land. Air monitoring on and off site
can also be used. As responders approach the scene to gather additional information,
appropriate protective equipment should be worn (Garcia et al., 2011). Initial responders
should also notify local authorities as soon as possible. Response personnel should
continue gathering information and adjusting their response efforts as appropriate (NLM,
2015).
Next, NATO (n.d.) recommends that response efforts are focused on scene
management to control the hazard. This includes establishing hazard zones, cordoning
off contaminated areas, and managing/restricting traffic. As part of life-saving efforts,
the inner cordon (similar to the initial isolation zone) should be evacuated and restricted
to first responders wearing appropriate protective gear, and evacuation should be
considered in the surrounding area. At this point, responders may decide to notify
additional specialists for guidance on mitigating the CBRN hazard and collection and
analysis of samples (NATO, n.d.).
Hazard Zone Control
Incident scene management is a complicated process involving many factors, so
responders may use different strategies to establish hazard zones (Karasova, Abrahart, &
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Jackson, 2007). Schnepp (2010) and Lesak (1999) recognize variation and flexibility in
how control zones are established for different incidents and by different agencies and
notes that most responders use a similar process, but may use different terminology. A
common strategy is to define three control zones referred to as hot, warm, and cold zones
(ATSDR, 2001; OnGUARD, 1996; Cashman, 2008). The hot zone is similar to the
Emergency Response Guidebook’s (ERG) initial isolation and protective action zones.
The first zone is the hot zone, which immediately surrounds the hazard, is the most
contaminated, and presents a danger to life or health. Only responders who need to be
close to the hazard should enter the hot zone, and appropriate protective gear should be
worn. The hot zone will vary in size based on the properties of the hazard. Various
resources exist to aid in determining the size of the hot zone, such as plume modeling,
atmospheric monitoring, and the ERG (DOT et al., 2012). Just outside the hot zone is the
warm zone. The warm zone provides forward access and transition points for support
personnel and equipment and includes the decontamination corridor. The cold zone is
just outside the warm zone and establishes a safe area for the command post, various
outside agencies, medical triage, media, and staging. The three zones commonly form
concentric circles around the hazard (OnGUARD, 1996; Schnepp, 2010). Another
common shape for the control zones is the keyhole, which consists of a circular region
directly around the incident and an expanding wedge in the downwind direction
(Goldblatt & Weinisch, 2005). While these cordon layouts are slightly different than the
ERG, which is discussed later in this chapter, OnGUARD (1996) and Lesak (1999) still
recommend that responders reference the ERG to determine appropriate distances for the
specific hazard. However, Lesak also acknowledges that the ERG, plume models, and
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other similar references are guidelines and hazard distance determination is in some ways
an art. Furthermore, hazard zones are likely to change as more information is gathered
and as the situation or conditions change (Garcia et al., 2011).
Lesak (1999) identifies additional concepts for incident isolation and control. The
incident perimeter designates the boundary past which only properly trained and
protected personnel should enter. In addition to hot, warm, and cold zones, a fourth zone
outside the incident perimeter is important to recognize, because personnel will pass from
that zone to the inner zones. A circle is not always the best choice for the hot zone. Other
shapes, such as keyhole, block, or teardrop shapes may be more appropriate, but the hot
zone serves the same purpose regardless of shape. Lesak also describes subzones within
each zone. For example, the hot zone includes the immediately dangerous to life and
health (IDLH) line, which designates a subzone. Another consideration is that
contaminants actually spread in three-dimensional space, so while cordons tend to be
established along the ground, it may be appropriate to consider how far upwards the
hazard could spread. This is especially true if multiple-story buildings are involved.
Garcia et al. (2011) recognize similar hot, warm, and cold zones, but recommend
a unique shape for the cordons in an open area incident. The hot zone is an area
immediately surrounding and downwind of the hazard release location. The hot zone
slowly expands as the distance from the release increases. The warm zone is a crescent
shape bordering the hot zone only on the upwind side. The cold zone exists outside both
the hot and warm zones. The authors also recommend various minimum distances for the
parameters of the zones, but do not provide the rationale behind those recommendations.
They do acknowledge that distances are incident specific.
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Cordons will be set up differently depending on the surrounding environment and
infrastructure, as well. The specific location can impact the tactical decisions regarding
where to set up cordons. For example, uphill and upwind may be in different directions
from the release site, the site might be between large buildings, or the release could occur
on a major highway in a downtown region (Lesak, 1999). When establishing isolation
zones, a busy downtown area in a large city involves different issues than a rural area on
a highway. The cordon should control access points near the incident site. For example,
intersections, on ramps, and other traffic routes are logical choices for control points.
Additionally, law enforcement may need to block or redirect traffic on nearby roads and
intersections (Schnepp, 2010). Responders generally establish staging areas and
command posts upwind of the hazard. However, if physical barriers such as highway
sound barriers block access, the hot zone may need to expand to allow for a less than
ideal staging location relative to the hazard. Wind direction can also affect where
responders choose to delineate hazard zones. A shift in wind directions may require a
change in cordons, or, if the incident occurs in an urban region, the effect of buildings on
wind speed, direction, and stability can be significant (Lesak, 1999).
Responder Efficiency
Many factors can affect responder efficiency. The number of available
responders with the appropriate knowledge and skills for a CBRN response is an
important consideration. Similarly, fatigue and shift-work affect the availability of
responders for the duration of the response. Equipment also affects responder efficiency.
For a CBRN incident in particular, specialized equipment may be needed. Other
resources can also be enabling during a response; for example, support organizations like
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the DOT and mutual aid agreements can provide additional support that improves
efficiency. A critical factor for many incidents is the quality of emergency operations
plans or other checklists. The specific location and time of day can also influence
efficiency. Remote areas may require less personnel but be harder to access. During
rush hour, responders and evacuation efforts might be hampered by the additional traffic
congestion. During winter, snow and ice conditions may slow response transit times
(EPA, 1994). In general, more hazard zone control points or cordons increase logistical
challenges, because those cordons must be established and maintained (Lesak, 1999).
Shadow Evacuation
Shadow evacuation can be a complicating issue during an incident response.
When individuals become aware of a hazardous incident, they interpret their risk based
on the information available to them and their personal perception of vulnerability (Dash
& Gladwin, 2007). Sometimes, people who are outside the hazard area will choose to
self-evacuate to a location farther from the hazard. This is known as shadow evacuation,
because the region of shadow evacuees tends to be around the mandatory, and if
applicable voluntary, evacuation zones. Extra evacuees add burden to the evacuation
traffic process (Goldblatt & Weinisch (2005). In some cases, one area might be directed
to evacuate, another to shelter-in-place, and another to take no protective action. People
from any area may choose to self-evacuate, even if that action actually exposes them to
more risk (Sorenson, 2004). Similar to shadow evacuation, expanding hazard zones may
result in additional evacuation-related risks.
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Creeping Conservatism
During a response, various agencies may be involved in decisions about safety
levels or protective actions. Sometimes, each agency will select the more conservative
option, round up, or add a slight factor of safety. This phenomenon is referred to as
creeping conservatism (Lindell, 2000). For most CBRN incidents, reality dictates
deviations from the simple shapes of published hazard zone guidelines. When responders
add distance to the published hazard distances, such as by expanding the zones to the
nearest physical boundaries, they are effectively practicing creeping conservatism.

Protective Actions
Many researchers have investigated the relative merits of sheltering versus
evacuation in the wake of a CBRN incident. The decision is complex and can depend on
many potential factors, such as available shelter, population density, weather conditions,
and traffic (Sorenson, 2004; Chakrabarti & Parikh, 2013). Most researchers have found
that sheltering-in-place is more effective in minimizing casualties than evacuating in the
initial time frame after an outside CBRN incident, assuming that adequate shelter is
available (Dillon, 2014). However, there is not a clear consensus on the optimal timing
for sheltering or evacuating, and specific recommendations vary based on availability of
shelters, traffic networks, and the location of nearby population centers. In most CBRN
releases, there is little to no advance warning to the nearby population, so there is
insufficient time to evacuate before the contaminants arrive. There are additional hazards
associated with evacuation, especially if the release involved an explosion. For example,
people are directly exposed to the contaminant while outside, there may be debris in the
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evacuation path, traffic may become significantly congested, and debris may prevent or
slow vehicle traffic.
In the case of a 10 kiloton improvised nuclear device detonated in Washington
DC, Wein (2010) recommends sheltering in place underground for at least 12 hours to
minimize the number of deaths, although various factors influence the optimal strategy,
such as pedestrian traffic, availability of above and below ground shelters, selfevacuation compared to directed evacuation, and availability of medical care. To
minimize radiation exposure, Dillon (2014) determined that the optimal shelter time is
proportional to the dose rate. He suggests immediately transiting from inadequate to
adequate shelter if the distance can be travelled in about five minutes, but waiting to
transit if the adequate shelter is farther.

Exposure Guidelines
Various agencies have developed guidelines for airborne concentration thresholds
above which certain health effects can be expected. Three exposure guidelines frequently
used in the U.S. include acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs), emergency response
planning guidelines (ERPGs), and temporary emergency exposure limits (TEELs).
Additionally, immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) levels are sometimes used
for worker-specific protection guidelines or in the absence of the previous three
guidelines. Protective Action Guides (PAGs) are frequently used for radiological
exposures. The relevant exposure guidelines for this study’s selected hazards are shown
in Table 1.
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Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
AEGLs are developed using a rigorous methodology. Originally, the National
Research Council (NRC) developed AEGLs through the National Advisory Committee
for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances. Since 2011, the
National Academies of Science has taken responsibility for finalizing interim AEGLs that
were developed by the NRC (EPA, 2015). AEGLs account for the entire population,
including those more sensitive to airborne contaminants. AEGLs are developed at three
severity levels for five different time increments ranging from ten minutes to eight hours.
The lowest level, AEGL-1 designates the concentration above which the general
population can expect to experience irritation and other non-disabling, temporary health
effects. AEGL-2 designates the concentration above which the general population can
expect to experience serious, long-lasting health effects or impaired ability to implement
the appropriate protective actions, such as evacuation or shelter-in-place. AEGL-3
designates the concentration above which the general population can expect to experience
life-threatening effects or death (Brown, Freeman, & Haney, 2013).
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
The American Industrial Hygiene Association developed ERPGs using data from
human and animal studies. ERPGs include three levels of severity all at a duration of one
hour. ERPGs account for the general population and do not include sensitive individuals.
They do not include a factor of safety, and it is recommended that they not be
extrapolated to longer time durations of exposure (O’Mahony et al., 2008). The levels of
severity are similar to those for AEGLs. ERPG-1 designates the concentration below
which most individuals can expect to experience nothing more than mild temporary
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health effects. ERPG-2 designates the concentration below which most individuals can
expect to not experience any long-lasting or serious health effects or an impaired ability
to implement appropriate protective actions. ERPG-3 designates the concentration below
which most individuals can be exposed without life-threatening health effects (Brown,
Freeman, & Haney, 2013). Table 1 shows that the ERPG-2 concentrations are similar to
the AEGL-2 concentrations for four of the five chemical hazards of interest. The ERPG2 value is twice as high as the AEGL-2 value for sulfur dioxide.
Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits
The U.S. Department of Energy developed TEELs for chemicals that do not have
ERPGs. TEELs are approximations rather than estimations based on experimental data
from studies, as the ERPGs are, but they do follow a standard methodology. They do not
include a factor of safety and are developed for three levels of severity (O’Mahony et al.,
2008). TEEL-2 concentrations are defined the same way as ERPG-2 values, but TEEL-2
values use exposure durations of only 15 minutes. TEELs have been developed for over
3,000 chemicals (Brown, Freeman, & Haney, 2013).
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) developed
IDLH values to designate where workers should use respirator protection. An IDLH
condition is defined as a condition that “poses a threat of exposure to airborne
contaminants when that exposure is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed
permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from such an environment” (NIOSH,
1994). IDLH values are generally higher than ERPG-2 or AEGL-2 values, because
IDLH is designed for a healthy adult population exposed for a duration of only 30
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minutes (Brown, Freeman, & Haney, 2013). As shown in Table 1, the IDLH values are
considerably larger than the corresponding AEGL-2 and ERPG-2 values.
Protective Action Guides
First developed in the 1960s, the EPA (2013) defines a PAG as “the projected
dose to an individual from a release of radioactive material at which a specific protective
action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended.” PAGs are developed following
three principles: prevention of acute effects, balance between protection and other
factors such that benefits outweigh harm, and reduction of chronic effects risk. During
the early phase of an incident, usually lasting hours to days, the recommended PAG is
one to five rem over four days. This means that if the projected dose to the whole body
exceeds one to five rem over four days, then evacuation or shelter-in-place should be
implemented. The projected dose is affected by factors such as duration of the plume,
rate of release, terrain, physical properties of the particles, wind speed, and air turbulence.
The EPA (2013) publishes a PAG Manual that includes guidance on how to calculate
projected doses.
Table 1: Exposure Guidelines (NOAA, 2016; CDC, 2015; NIOSH, 2011; EPA, 2013)

AEGL-2
(60 min)
ERPG-2
(60 min)
IDLH (30
min)
PAG

Anhydrous
Ammonia
160 ppm

Chlorine

VX

Sarin

RDD

2 ppm

Sulfur
Dioxide
0.75 ppm

0.00027 ppm

0.006 ppm

--

150 ppm

3 ppm

3 ppm

--

--

--

300 ppm

10 ppm

100 ppm

0.003 mg/m3

0.1 mg/m3

--

--

--

--

--

--

1-5 rem/
4 days
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Hazard Distance Determination
Several factors affect the appropriate distances to use for CBRN hazard zones. In
the early stages of response, this is accomplished by selecting the basic conditions in the
ERG and setting up cordons at the corresponding initial isolation and protective action
distances. In later stages of response, additional information will allow responders to
adjust the cordons to be more accurate. For example, responders can use plume modeling
software to refine the theoretical extent of the airborne contamination and sampling
procedures to refine the actual extent of the ground truth. Both early and later methods
rely on similar basic information, such as type of chemical, size of release, time of day,
wind direction, and wind speeds. Later methods may include more details in those
categories, as well as additional information.
Different chemicals or classes of chemicals have different physical properties,
which leads to different hazard distances. For example, dense chemical gases that are
heavier than air tend to sink, engage in less vertical mixing, and disperse into the
atmosphere more slowly than neutrally buoyant gases (Brown, Freeman, & Haney,
2013). Volatile chemicals tend to evaporate and thus dissipate more quickly, but also
spread out over a greater distance than nonvolatile liquids.
The volume of the release has obvious implications for the extent of the
contamination. Larger releases result in larger required hazard distances.
Brown, Freeman, and Haney (2013) explain how time of day significantly affects
the chemical’s passive dispersion in the atmosphere. Typically, air temperature lowers as
altitude increases; temperature inversion is the opposite scenario where a band of warmer
air is above colder air. This warmer air acts as a sort of cap, such that the rising air
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cannot continue to rise. This causes a convective boundary layer from the surface of the
earth to the lowest temperature inversion, and the atmosphere tends to be unstable and
turbulent. During the day, the sun warms the earth’s surface, which warms the air
directly above the surface. This warmer air rises and cools until the lowest temperature
inversion is encountered, which may be fairly large. This vertical air movement
contributes to a more rapid dispersion of chemical contaminants. During the night, the
earth’s heat escapes to space, and the air closest to the earth’s surfaces cools the fastest.
This forms a stratified boundary layer that is more stable and less turbulent. The
reduction in energy contributes to a lower, thin layer close to the earth’s surface. This
results in less air mixing and vertical dispersion of contaminants. Because of this
behavior, daytime spills require smaller hazard distances than nighttime spills. The
difference between a daytime spill with no cloud cover and a nighttime spill with no
cloud cover can be as much as three orders of magnitude.
Wind direction doesn’t contribute to the size of the hazard distances, but rather
the direction of the protective action zone. As expected, airborne hazards tend to spread
in the direction of the wind. However, wind speed does affect hazard distances. Higher
wind speeds result in more air mixing and faster dispersion into the atmosphere, so
smaller distances are required. Lower wind speeds are more stable and slowly spread out
from the spill location, requiring larger distances.

Standard Hazard Zone Distances
Currently, the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) is the primary reference
for responders in North America to determine appropriate cordon distances for hazardous
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material releases during the initial phase of the incident, and many emergency response
resources direct readers to the ERG for initial incident information (NLM, 2015;
Schnepp, 2010; Cashman, 2008; OnGUARD, 1996; Lesak, 1999). Produced by the U.S.
DOT, Transport Canada, and Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of
Mexico, it is specifically intended for transportation incidents. While there may limited
use for the ERG during a fixed facility incident, the recommended hazard distances were
determined using transportation scenarios (Brown, Freeman, & Haney, 2013). For a
fixed facility incident, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(1986) mandates that communities plan for incidents at facilities that use or store
hazardous chemicals. These plans include evacuation plans and the identification of
populations and areas likely to be impacted by an incident. Additionally, facilities are
required to maintain specific chemical information in material safety data sheets and to
make this information available to emergency response agencies and the public. This
research focuses on transportation incidents.
The ERG contains four sections. The first two sections can be used to identify the
material and its guide number. The third section provides guidelines for each guide
number that explain potential hazards and appropriate response actions. The final section
establishes guidelines for the initial isolation and protective action distances. This fourth
section provides information for small and large spills and day and night conditions. It
also provides additional details for a selected set of hazardous inhalation materials that
comprise the majority of transportation related spills. The initial isolation zone is a
circular region directly around the incident site. Within the initial isolation zone, lifethreatening conditions can occur downwind of the release and dangerous conditions can
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occur upwind due to wind direction variation. The protective action zone is a square area
in the downwind wind direction where protective actions, such as evacuation or shelterin-place, should be initiated for the general population. The geometry used to establish
the initial isolation and protective action zones is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: ERG's Initial Isolation and Protective Action Zones (DOT et al., 2012)

The DOT determined the protective action distances for each material using a
statistical analysis of release amounts and rates, downwind dispersion, and toxicological
exposure guidelines. Thousands of possible releases were modeled for each chemical
using data generated from dispersion models, meteorological observations, and the
Hazardous Materials Information System database. To account for the likely differences
between chemicals used as a weapon and accidental spills, such as a greater proportion of
releases in an urban area for deliberate releases, different release scenarios were
generated in the analysis. Distances were defined by health criteria using final AEGL-2
levels, ERPG-2 levels, interim AEGL-2 levels, or animal studies and expert opinion, in
that order of priority. Final AEGL values were used for the three TIC/TIMs and two
chemical warfare agents studied in this research. The 90th percentile distances of the
resulting distributions are reported as protective action distances in the ERG. The initial
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isolation distances are determined by selecting the smaller of two values: the distance
corresponding with the one-hour LC50 concentration level or 15% of the protective action
distance during the day for gases and 7.5% of the protective action distance during the
day for liquids (Brown, Freeman, & Haney, 2013). The LC50 value is the lethal
concentration at which 50% of the exposed population is expected to die.
For the purposes of this research, a large TIC/TIM spill (more than 55 U.S.
gallons) involving a highway tank truck or trailer in moderate winds (between 6 and 12
miles per hour) during the day was selected for study. For the chemical warfare agents
VX and GB, a large release (4.4 to 55 pounds) during the day was selected. The
reasoning behind the selected conditions is discussed further in Chapter 3. The relevant
distances are shown in Table 2 (DOT et al., 2012).
Table 2: ERG Hazard Distances

Hazard
Ammonia, Anhydrous
Chlorine
Sulfur Dioxide
VX (used as a weapon)
GB, Sarin (used as a weapon)

Initial Isolation Distance
125 m / 400 ft
1,000 m / 3,000 ft
1,000 m / 3,000 ft
60 m / 200 ft
400 m / 1,250 ft

Protective Action Distance
500 m / 0.3 miles
3,500 m / 2.2 miles
7,600 m / 4.7 miles
400 m / 0.2 miles
2,100 m / 1.3 miles

Musolino et al. (2013) provides guidelines for RDD hazard zones based on over
1,000 experiments conducted at the Sandia National Laboratories for more than 25 years.
They used the data from these experiments to determine the most probable hazard
boundaries for an initial response when no information about the material or geometry is
known, setting the initial hot zone at 250 meters. The hot zone is similar to the initial
isolation zone and designates the area restricted to emergency responders in appropriate
protective gear. Between a 250 meter radius and a 500 meter radius and within 2,000
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meters in the downwind direction, people should remain in or seek out an intact building
to shelter in until directed to evacuate. Once measurements are made and more
information is known, the use of National Council of Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP) boundaries is recommended. Musolino’s recommendations are
shown in Table 3, and the layout of the recommended zones is shown in Figure 2.
Table 3: Musolino RDD Hazard Distances

Hazard
Radiological Dispersal
Device

Initial Hot Zone
250 m

Sheltering Zone
500 m radius and
2,000 m downwind

Figure 2: RDD Recommended Hazard Zones (adapted from Musolino et al., 2013)

Summary
This chapter reviewed the relevant literature concerning technological and
human-caused hazards and their effects, typical incident response management protocols,
factors affecting the decision to evacuate or shelter-in-place, exposure guidelines, and
standard hazard zone determinations and recommendations. Three technological and
three human-caused hazards were selected for use in this study, as they provide a range of
possible incidents, chemical properties, and physiological effects. Incident response
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management is a complex process involving a plethora of factors, including incident
commander judgement and experience, that influence the specific procedures
implemented, although there are commonalities in CBRN incident management and
hazard zone implementation. Responders typically direct either evacuation or shelter-inplace for the population within the hazard zones; this is also a complex decision
incorporating many variables. Hazard zone recommendations generally rely on exposure
guidelines that connect physiological effects to protective actions. In the United States,
the Emergency Response Guidebook (DOT et al., 2012) is used by most emergency
responders to determine initial isolation and protective action distances for hundreds of
chemicals, and Musolino et al.’s (2013) recommendation is widely used to determine
isolation and sheltering zones for radiological dispersal device incidents.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
Managing CBRN incidents is a complex process involving many steps. An
important step in the initial phase of response is the set-up of hazard zones. In the U.S.
and in this research, the Emergency Response Guidebook (DOT, 2012) and Musolino et
al. (2013) is referenced to determine standard hazard distances and zones for chemical
and radiological releases, respectively. The methodology for this research was developed
to answer the three research questions:
1. How do published emergency hazard zones for various CBRNE incidents
change when adapted to physical boundaries?
2. What effects do different environments and locations have on emergency
hazard zones when the zones are adapted to physical boundaries?
3. Is there a preferred set of physical boundaries that improves responder
efficiency?
These questions were answered by developing a program to use with ESRI’s
ArcGIS® 10.2 software (2014). This research lends itself to geospatial analysis, because
the research seeks to describe the relationship between hazard zones with particular
dimensions, surrounding physical boundaries, areal calculations, and residential
population estimates. The input data of road, railroad, and river networks and population
counts are geospatial data, because they inherently include geographic locations. A
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geographic information system (GIS) enables geospatial analysis, which incorporates
data’s geographic location into a statistical analysis.
To understand the changes in CBRN hazard zones when adapted to physical
boundaries, data were collected and multiple analyses were conducted. The methodology
consisted of three main stages. First, locations for the CBRN incidents were selected,
and GIS data was obtained. Second, a simulation was developed in ArcGIS® 10.2 to
automate the construction of hazard zones, calculation of the affected population and area
for each zone, and counting of the number of intersections in the cordon boundaries.
Finally, the data collected from the simulations were analyzed using statistical
comparisons.

Location Selection
Three main locations were selected for this research by analyzing U.S.
Department of Transportation data from 1 January 2010 through 10 July 2015. The data
includes reported accidental chemical release incidents in the United States. Incident
totals were sorted by city to determine where the highest incident rates occurred.
Additionally, because relatively non-hazardous paint spills (UN1263) accounted for a
large number of incidents (17,055 out of 78,512), paint spills were removed and the
dataset reanalyzed. The data were also considered by looking at transportation incidents
rather than the combined fixed facility and transportation incidents. The cities with the
highest number of incidents are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: U.S. Chemical Release Incidents (2010-2015)

Total Incidents
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Houston, TX
Hodgkins, IL
Jacksonville, FL
Salt Lake City, UT
Portland, OR
Memphis, TN
Dallas, TX
Columbus, OH
Indianapolis, IN
Phoenix, AZ

Total (without paint)
1319
1269
795
786
766
764
734
728
684
634

Hodgkins, IL
Houston, TX
Columbus, OH
Jacksonville, FL
Salt Lake City, UT
Portland, OR
Commerce City, CO
Memphis, TN
Dallas, TX
Indianapolis, IN

1195
974
634
621
580
560
557
557
510
493

Transit (without paint)
Hodgkins, IL
Addison, IL
Columbus, OH
Houston, TX
Commerce City, CO
Jacksonville, FL
Bloomington, CA
Earth City, MO
Dallas, TX
Ellenwood, GA

1012
384
321
302
261
256
192
154
151
145

Additionally, the data were analyzed for the three TIC/TIM chemicals of interest:
anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, and sulfur dioxide. Because these selections resulted in
less data, the date range was expanded to include 20 years from 1995 to 2015. The
results were primarily used to verify that those chemicals could be present in those
locations rather than rank ordering the cities.
Chicago, Houston, and Denver were selected for analysis. Hodgkins and Addison
are suburbs of Chicago, Beaumont is a suburb of Houston, and Commerce City is a
suburb of Denver. The GIS data for these locations were downloaded from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s TIGER/Line (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015) website by state. The data
consisted of shapefiles pre-joined to 2010 census block population counts. The GIS data
with roads, railroads, and waterways were downloaded from the Census Bureau and the
U.S. Geological Survey’s National Map Viewer (U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2015).
These locations may not represent the top three most likely locations for a
chemical incident to occur. However, they still represent areas where chemical incidents
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have a high likelihood of occurrence and serve as case study areas for this research. To
capture a wider range of location types, three locations were selected near each
metropolitan area: downtown/urban, suburban, and rural just outside the city.
Additionally, Houston and Chicago represent plains terrain, whereas Denver represents
mountainous terrain.

Research Simulation
A model was developed in ArcGIS® to standardize and automate the creation of
hazard zones, calculation of population and area affected by the zones, and counting of
intersections in the new hazard zone boundaries.
Initial Conditions
Initial conditions for the incidents were determined to be the same or similar for
each hazard scenario. The ERG (2012) lists hazard distances for large and small spills,
day and night conditions, and wind speeds. Large spills are defined as more than 55
gallons (between 4.4 and 55 pounds for certain chemical warfare agents, including VX
and GB). Day is defined as between sunrise and sunset. High wind is defined as more
than 12 mph, moderate wind is 6-12 mph, and low wind is less than 6 mph. Container
types include rail tank car, highway tank truck or trailer, agricultural nurse tank (for
anhydrous ammonia), multiple ton cylinders, and multiple small cylinders or single ton
cylinder. Wind speeds and container types are only differentiated for large spills of the
six common TIHs; all other hazards don’t consider these differences.
Wind direction was selected using the prevailing wind direction for that location.
The prevailing wind direction was defined as the wind direction that occurred most
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frequently over all months of the year. In Houston, the prevailing winds are from the
southeast (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2015), and the average wind
speed is 9.02 mph (National Water and Climate Center, 2002). In Chicago, the prevailing
winds are from the southwest, and the average wind speed is about 10.6 mph (Wendland,
1981; Illinois State Climatologist Office, 2004). In Denver, the prevailing winds are
from the south, and the average wind speed is 10.0 mph (Western Regional Climate
Center, 2002 & 2008). Each of these wind speeds falls within the moderate wind
category in the ERG.
Large spills involving highway tank trucks or trailers during the day in moderate
winds were selected as initial conditions. Using large spills provides for a more
conservative approach than small spills. Highway trucks are commonly used for
hazardous materials transport, could reasonably be used in an intentional release, and are
prevalent throughout the U.S. anywhere that roads exist. Daytime is a more likely
condition for an intentional release, and more people are likely to be outside and
impacted by the incident. Moderate winds were selected, because average annual wind
speeds fall within the moderate category in each city. Changing any of these initial
conditions could result in different standard hazard distances. For example, small spills
have smaller hazard distances, rail tank car accidents have larger hazard distances, and
night conditions have larger hazard distances.
These initial conditions were used as inputs to determine the standard hazard
zones based on ERG (DOT et al., 2012) and Musolino’s (2013) guidance. The
dimensions of the standard hazard zones were then created in ArcMapTM in the three
cities of interest. Three initial maps (one for each metropolitan area) were created using
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data from TIGER/Line data from the U.S. Census Bureau and USGS data. The maps
consisted of roads, railroads, rivers, and census block data across the entire metropolitan
area. The maps were then further subdivided into downtown, suburban, and rural regions
(see Figure 3). Using a random number generator, specific hazard impact locations were
chosen. The specific hazards and release locations were used to calculate the growth of
hazard zones by using physical boundaries.
ArcGIS® Model
The hazard zones were expanded to the nearest physical boundaries, which are
defined as roads, railroads, and rivers. Hazard zones were expanded to go around any
boundaries that the original cordons intersected. Additionally, they were expanded to the
nearest boundary. By design, hazard zones were not allowed to shrink in size, so
matching physical boundaries resulted in equal or larger areas. This choice ensured that
the new hazard zones did not assume any additional risk to the population.
ArcGIS® was used to calculate the area and population enclosed by each cordon
for each case. The model loops through each hazard type and each random point location
to generate and compile data for each metropolitan area. Additionally, the model counts
the number of intersections in each new hazard zone cordon to describe responder
efficiency. From a practical standpoint, roads are likely to be used in setting up hazard
cordons anywhere that roads exist. Therefore, roads are included in every boundary set.
Requiring roads to be included in every set results in four combinations of boundaries:
roads only, roads and railroads, roads and rivers, and all three. To compare efficiency
among different sets of physical boundaries, the new hazard zones are generated four
times – once for each combination of physical boundaries. The complete python scripts
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are included in Appendix A. The general algorithm is outlined below. A chlorine spill
located in suburban Denver was used to illustrate the process. Each map uses the Canada
Albers Equal Area Conic projected coordinate system with the North American 1983
datum and central meridian of -96.0.
Python Model Algorithm
1. Initialization:
a. Set up physical boundary files with a separate python script (this was
accomplished only once per city).
i. Ensure a consistent projection that preserves areas.
ii. Clip roads, railroads, rivers, and census blocks to relevant areas
in order to reduce the size of the geodatabase file and improve
processing time.
iii. Create shapefiles for physical boundaries: Roads; Merge roads
and railroads; Merge roads and rivers; and Merge roads,
railroads, and rivers to create four shapefiles.
iv. Break all roads, railroads, and rivers into line segments at every
intersection, so that every boundary can be used and to identify
intersections that will later be counted.
b. Define inputs of wind direction, spill regions, city name, and number
of random points to be generated within each region.
c. Define program variables that are in the geodatabase file or will be
created and saved in the geodatabase file.
d. Delete old versions of layers and tables.
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e. Assign standard hazard distances based on hazard using the ERG
(2012) and Musolino et al. (2013) recommendations.
f. Generate random points within each of three regions and add XY
coordinate data for each point.

Figure 3: Denver regions and random spills (Steps 1a-f)

g. Add field in census block attribute table to store original shape areas
for each census block.
h. Create an empty table to store statistics with all relevant fields. This
table will contain the data used to answer the research questions in
Chapter IV.
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Table 5: Statistics Table Attributes and Descriptions (Step 1h)

OBJECTID
Frequency
Sum_Pop_Affected
SUM_Area_Affected
Hazard
Zone
Std_New
Environment
City
Point_num
Vertices
Boundary_Set
Pop_diff
Area_diff
Pop_diff_per
Area_diff_per

Unique identifier used by ArcGIS®
Number of census blocks affected
Total population affected by the zone
Total area affected by the zone (square meters)
Number 0-5 identifying hazard
Initial Isolation or Protective Action
Standard or New zones
Urban, Suburban, or Rural
Chicago, Denver, or Houston
Spill location point number
Number of intersections
NA = standard zones do not use boundaries, R = roads, RRail =
roads and railroads, RRiver = roads and rivers, RRR = all three
Population difference between standard and new zones
Area difference between standard and new zones
Percent difference in population between standard and new zones
Percent difference in area between standard and new zones

2. Calculate Standard Initial Isolation Zone:
a. Select the first (or next) spill location point and hazard.
b. Create a buffer based on hazard distances around the selected spill
location point for the initial isolation zone, using the information from
step 1e.
c. Clip census block data by the initial isolation zone buffer to determine
the number of people affected.
d. Calculate population and area affected and count intersections:
i. Add population and area fields in attribute table of clipped data
ii. Calculate affected areas of each census block in square meters
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Figure 4: Chlorine spill in suburban Denver

Figure 5: Initial isolation zone (Step 2b)

Figure 6: Census blocks clipped (Step 2c)

Figure 7: Intersections (Step 2dv)

iii. Calculate affected populations using census data, and calculate
proportions of populations in blocks that are intersected by the
initial isolation zone.
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iv. Sum populations and areas for the entire initial isolation zone.
v. Count the intersections of the zone with nearby boundaries.
e. Add statistics to statistics table
3. Calculate Standard Protective Action Zone:
a. Read the XY coordinates for the spill location from step 2a.
b. Calculate the coordinates of corners of the protective action zone given
the spill location coordinates, and rotate according to the wind
direction.
c. Create a rectangle from the corner coordinates to establish the extent
of the protective action zone.

Figure 8: Standard downwind zone (Step 3c)

Figure 9: Zones without overlap (Step 3d)

d. Subtract from the protective action zone the area that intersects the
initial isolation zone, so that areas and population are not double
counted.
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e. Clip the census block data by protective action zone to determine the
number of people affected.

Figure 10: Census data clipped to protective action zone (Step 3e)

f. Compile statistics for population and area affected using the same
process as step 2d for the protective action zone.
g. Add the total number of intersections in the initial isolation and
protective action zones, and record the sum in the statistics table. As
shown in Table 6, the area and population affected by the standard
hazard zones, as well as the number of intersections (labeled
“Vertices”) have been added. However, the statistics that will be used
to answer the research questions (labeled Pop_diff, Area_diff,
Pop_diff_per, and Area_diff_per) have not yet been calculated;
placeholders or null values are put in those columns in the table.
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Figure 11: Standard hazard zone intersections (Step 3g)

Table 6: Statistics Table with Standard Hazard Zones Data (Steps 3f-g)

At the conclusion of Step 3, the standard initial isolation and protective action
zones have been generated, the populations and areas affected by each have been
calculated, and the total number of intersections in the cordons has been counted. This is
the baseline that the new zones will be compared against.
4. Calculate New Initial Isolation Zone (matched to physical boundaries):
a. Select lines of interest that will be used to draw the new hazard zone.
i. Select all lines within a sufficient buffer distance of the
standard initial isolation zone.
ii. Remove from selection the lines that cross the boundary of the
standard initial isolation zone.
54

iii. Remove from selection the lines that are within the initial
isolation zone.

Figure 13: Lines selected for new zone (Step 4c)

Figure 12: Lines selected around zone (Step 4a)

b. Turn selected lines into polygons.
c. Select the polygon that contains the initial isolation zone – this is the
expansion of the initial isolation zone to the nearest physical
boundaries.
d. Ensure the polygon (new isolation zone) does not contain holes.
Figure 13 illustrates that some polygons have holes completely within
the polygon if a smaller polygon between the standard zone and
expanded zone can be created using roads, railroads, and rivers.
Eliminating any such holes ensures no areas are marked as “safe” if
they are within a larger hazard area.
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e. Clip census block data by the new initial isolation zone to determine
population affected.

Figure 14: Census data clipped to new initial isolation zone (Step 4e)

f. Compile statistics for population and area affected using the same
process as step 2d for the new initial isolation zone.
5. Calculate New Protective Action Zone:
a. Select lines of interest using the same process as step 4a for the new
protective action zone.
b. Turn the selected lines into polygons.
c. Select the polygon that contains the protective action zone – this is the
expansion of the protective action zone to the nearest physical
boundaries.
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d. Ensure the polygon (new protective action zone) does not contain
holes.

Figure 15: Lines selected for new zone (Step 5c)

Figure 16: New protective action zone (Step 5c)

e. Subtract from the new protective action zone the area that intersects
the new initial isolation zone.
f. Clip census block data by the new protective action zone to determine
the population affected.
g. Compile statistics for population and area affected using the same
process as step 2d for the protective action zone.
h. Add the total number of intersections in the new initial isolation and
protective action zones, and record the sum in the statistics table.
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Figure 17: Zone without overlap (Step 5e)

Figure 18: Census data clipped to zone (Step 5f)

Figure 19: New hazard zone intersections (Step 5h)
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At the conclusion of Step 5h, the new initial isolation and protective action zones
have been generated, the populations and areas affected by each have been calculated,
and the total number of intersections in the new cordons has been counted. This is what
the standard hazards zones from Steps 2-3 will be compared to.
i. Calculate statistics to fill in the following columns:
i. Pop_diff: Subtract the populations affected by the standard
hazard zones from the populations affected by the new hazard
zones.
ii. Area_diff: Subtract the areas affected by the standard hazard
zones from the areas affected by the new hazard zones.
iii. Pop_diff_per: Divide the population difference by the standard
hazard zones’ population to calculate a percent difference.
iv. Area_diff_per: Divide the area difference by the standard
hazard zones’ area to calculate a percent difference.
v. If a new protective action zone does not exist, add a row in
table. This can occur if the new initial isolation zone is so
large that it encompasses the entire standard protective action
zone. In this case, a row is created to calculate and store the
same statistics using values of zero for the population and area
affected by the new protective action zone.
Table 7: Statistics Table with Standard and New Statistics (Step 5i)
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6. Steps 4 and 5 are repeated for each of four sets of physical boundaries (roads,
roads and railroads, roads and rivers, and all three).
Table 8: Statistics Table with All Four Boundary Sets (Step 6)

7. Steps 2-6 are repeated for each location point and each hazard type using
while and for loops.
As a comparison of different hazards and different environments, Figure 20 shows
an overall perspective of the chlorine spill in suburban Denver with both the standard and
new hazard zones, and Figure 21 shows an overall perspective of an RDD attack at the
same location in suburban Denver. Using a different scale, Figure 22 shows an
anhydrous ammonia spill in rural Denver, and Figure 23 shows a VX attack at the same
location in rural Denver.

60

Figure 20: Suburban Denver - Chlorine

Figure 21: Suburban Denver - RDD

Figure 22: Rural Denver - Anhydrous Ammonia

Figure 23: Rural Denver - VX

An ArcGIS® tool was also created following the same general process as outlined
above. However, it was designed to be useful as a tool for a specific incident. The basis
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of this model could be adapted to a tool and integrated with incident management
systems for responders to use on-site or in an emergency operations center for a particular
incident with a single release. The model prompts the user for the hazard type, wind
direction, location name, geodatabase to save outputs to, specific spill location, census
data shapefile, and infrastructure shapefile(s). The model outputs the standard and new
hazard zone polygons, the areas and populations affected by each zone, and the number
of vertices in each polygon. Responders could use this information for decision support
during an incident. The script for this tool is in Appendix B.

Statistical Analysis
A statistical analysis was conducted using the ArcGIS® model to answer the
research questions. First, a sampling plan was created to determine what and how much
data to collect with the model. Then, paired t-tests were conducted to answer the first
research question of determining how published hazard zones change when adapted to
physical boundaries. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to answer the
second research question of determining the effects that different environments and
locations have on how the hazard zones change when adapted to physical boundaries. To
answer the third research question of determining if there exists a set of physical
boundaries that improves responder efficiency, a comparison of mean number of
intersections was performed to select the boundary set with the fewest intersections.
Sampling Plan
A sampling plan was created to generate the data needed to answer the research
questions. To determine a sufficient number of specific release locations for each
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scenario (city, area, and hazard), a power analysis was conducted to detect a practical
difference in areas and populations between the standard and new hazard zones. Each
release location was associated with six theoretical releases to account for each hazard
type. Each theoretical release generated nine statistics of interest:

-

Difference in populations affected by standard and new hazard zones

-

Difference in areas affected by standard and new hazard zones

-

Percent change in population affected by new hazard zone

-

Percent change in area affected by new hazard zone

-

Intersections in standard hazard zones

-

Intersections in new hazard zones using roads

-

Intersections in new hazard zones using roads and railroads

-

Intersections in new hazard zones using roads and rivers

-

Intersections in new hazard zones using roads, railroads, and rivers

A proxy variable was used to represent responder efficiency. The number of
intersections in the final polygons generated for the new zones matched to physical
boundaries was used (note that “intersection” represents a physical connection such as a
road intersection rather than the set theory function as used in ArcGIS®). The
intersections occur between any two boundaries (i.e., road, railroad, or river) included in
the new hazard zone or with a boundary that crosses the hazard zone. Therefore, more
complex shapes involving more intersections and turns were considered to have lower
responder efficiency. To determine a sufficient sample size for detecting the boundary
set with fewest intersections, a select the best procedure was used. The initial phase
simply used the data already generated for the first and second research questions;
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additional data was generated as needed for the secondary phase. Additionally, the
intersections in the new hazard zones were compared with the intersections in the
standard hazard zone. For the standard hazard zones, only physical boundaries that
crossed the hazard zone cordon were counted, because the hazard zones do not follow
physical boundary lines. Roads, railroads, and rivers crossing the cordon of the standard
hazard zones were included.
Practical Differences
Responders, local officials, and the local population are all affected by the size,
shape, and location of hazard zones. A larger area to establish a cordon around could
require more responders and more time to set up and maintain. This is especially true in
an urban environment, but may be less true in a rural environment. From the perspective
of the population affected, a larger area might impact travel in the surrounding region and
might take longer to complete an evacuation. A larger population means that protective
actions have to be implemented by more people. This could result in longer
implementation times and more complex communication needs. For evacuations, a
larger population can result in a greater traffic and pedestrian burden. A greater
evacuation distance from a larger area and/or a larger evacuating population also
increases risk of travel-related accidents. Finally, the number of people affected by a
hazard zone could influence the responders’ decision to initiate an evacuation or shelterin-place order and the timing of those decisions.
What constitutes a practical difference between populations and areas depends on
many variables. The degree to which a larger area or population will influence outcomes
such as response time, evacuation-related accidents, and communication networks
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depends on the specific scenario. For example, the road network in a given location may
be robust against large increases in evacuation traffic, but the road network in a different
location may get congested with even a small increase in traffic. Another variable
influencing the impact of an increase in area or population is the community’s response
capability. A larger response force or more advanced technology may make emergency
responders more resilient to larger or more complex hazard zones.
Because of the many variables involved in defining a practical difference from
one scenario to the next, this research considered a more objective measure to compare
differences against. This allows the reader to use the results to determine how important
the difference is to their situation with an established reference point. The measure
selected was average census block size and population for the areas of interest. Census
tracts generally range from 1,200 to 8,000 people with an optimal population of 4,000
people. Block-groups generally range from 600 to 3,000 people (U.S. Census Bureau,
2010). Census blocks are bounded by physical features and vary considerably in size and
population across the U.S., especially in less populated or rural areas. Distributions of
population and size by census block are strongly skewed positive. Because of this
variation and distribution, census block averages may not be meaningful when
considering an individual scenario. They are only used as practical differences, because
they are an objective and consistent value.
The national average census block size is 0.344 square miles (0.361 square miles
when water-only blocks are excluded). The national average census block population is
27.9 people (29.3 people when water-only blocks are excluded). Averages for the three
states of interest are given in Table 9. Considering smaller areas of interest within the
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state (e.g. Chicago and surrounding area) and excluding obvious outliers (e.g. Lake
Michigan), the averages do not change significantly from the state-wide averages. Many
census blocks have a population of zero, so averages were also considered using only
blocks with a nonzero population. Based on these values, practical differences were
defined as 0.35 square miles and 50 people.
Table 9: Average Block Sizes and Populations

State

Average Block
Area (sq mi)

Colorado
Illinois
Texas

0.518
0.128
0.294

Average Block
Area (no wateronly blocks)
0.534
0.132
0.307

Average Block
Population
25.1
28.4
27.6

Average Block
Population (where
people live)
42.7
47.9
55.3

Because the number of intersections is a proxy variable rather than a direct
measure, a practically significant value is difficult to meaningfully define. After a small
sample of 270 data points was generated, the practical difference was defined as
approximately 10% of the mean. This resulted in a practical difference of 15
intersections.
Power Analysis
A power analysis was performed in JMP®. To estimate the variance, a small
sample of 270 total data points was generated. The practical difference was used as
described in the previous section, a significance level of 0.05 was chosen, and a power of
0.80 was chosen. Equation 1 was solved for sample size n by JMP® to find the required
sample size, where F is the F-distribution, f is the f statistic, 𝜖 is the practical significance
value or difference to detect, and σ is the estimated standard deviation (Barker, 2011).
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Equation 1 (Barker, 2011)

𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 [𝑓 > 𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 | 𝑓~𝐹 (1, 𝑛 − 1,

𝑛𝜖 2
𝜎2

)]

Based on this analysis, the required sample sizes are very large, ranging from
about 8,000 to a few million points. Fortunately, the initial sample also showed very
large means for population and area differences (about 3.8 square miles and 2,500
people), so the actual differences appear to be much larger than the selected practical
differences. Considering practical limitations of time, as much data as reasonable was
generated, and the results were monitored to verify that sufficient power would be
attained.
Statistical Comparison: Research Question 1
How do published emergency hazard zones for various CBRNE incidents change when
adapted to physical boundaries?
A statistical analysis was used to compare the areas and populations of the
standard hazard zones and the expanded hazard zones. To answer the first research
question, all the standard zones and expanded zones were compared in one-sided paired ttests. The paired t-tests considered the difference in total area affected, the difference in
total population affected, the percent difference in area affected, and the percent
difference in population affected. To mitigate possible issues with independence, the
data was sorted by hazard into six subsets. This resulted in 24 totals t-tests and
confidence intervals.
A significance level of 0.05 was initially selected. Initially, a conservative
approach to controlling error rates due to multiple tests was balanced with retaining
sufficient power to detect significant differences. However, because the actual
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differences were much larger than the practical differences, a less conservative approach
was deemed unnecessary. Therefore, Bonferroni’s approach was used to split the error
rate among all 24 tests. The significance level for each individual test was 0.002. The
differences are calculated as shown in Equation 2. Because the algorithm restricts the
hazard zones from shrinking, the expected result is a significant difference in which the
new zones are larger. Thus, a one-sided t-test is appropriate.
Equation 2

𝜇𝑑 = 𝜇𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝑑̅ = 𝑑̅𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑑̅𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑
The paired difference is defined as the new zone value minus the standard zone
value, so that the expected difference is positive. Equation 3 shows the test hypotheses
and the test statistic t. The null hypothesis is that the mean paired difference or percent
difference is less than or equal to zero; in other words, the null hypothesis states that the
new hazard zones affect no more area or population than the standard hazard zones. The
alternate hypothesis is that the paired or percent difference is greater than zero, such that
the new hazard zones affect a greater area or population than the standard hazard zones.
Equation 3

𝐻0 : 𝜇𝑑 ≤ 0
𝐻𝑎 : 𝜇𝑑 > 0
𝑡=

𝑑̅
𝑠𝑑 / √𝑛𝑑

The rejection region is defined as 𝑡 > 𝑡𝛼 based on (nd – 1) degrees of freedom, where nd
is the sample size.
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To better describe the difference and practical significance of the results,
confidence intervals were constructed for each of the paired difference tests. Equation 4
is used to construct the confidence intervals.
Equation 4

𝑑̅ ± 𝑡𝛼/2

𝑠𝑑
√𝑛𝑑

where 𝑑̅ is the mean paired difference, 𝑡𝛼/2 is the t-statistic associated with the
significance level α, 𝑠𝑑 is the sample standard deviation, and 𝑛𝑑 is the sample size. The
significance level is 0.002.
The t-test relies on the assumptions of normality and independent sampling. With
a sufficiently large sample size, the Central Limit Theorem ensures an approximately
normal distribution of the sample mean. A large sample size is typically defined as at
least 30 data points; this study exceeds that sample size. To ensure independent
sampling, the release locations were selected randomly within each region.
Statistical Comparison: Research Question 2
What effects do different environments and locations have on emergency hazard zones
when the zones are adapted to physical boundaries?
To answer the second research question, two ANOVAs were conducted with
response variables of paired differences of population affected and area affected and
factors of hazard, city, and environment. Additionally, all interactions were included for
a total of seven factors. The response is expected to vary based on hazard, because the
prescribed distances vary. Therefore, hazard was included in the analysis to reduce the
error in the other factors. City had three levels of Chicago, Houston, and Denver, and
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environment had three levels of urban, suburban, and rural. Figure 24 illustrates the
ANOVAs.

Figure 24: ANOVAs

The null hypothesis is that none of the factors explain the response; the alternate
hypothesis is that at least one of the factors explains the response. If the ANOVA F-test
indicates that at least one of the factors influences the response at a significance level of
0.05, then effect tests and least squares means plots will be considered. Additionally, a
Tukey test was conducted to analyze pair-wise comparisons with an experiment-wise
significance level of 0.05.
The internal validity of the ANOVA F-Test relies on three assumptions:
normality, constant variance, and independence. To test normality, the residuals were
plotted, and a goodness of fit test was conducted. The null hypothesis is that the
distribution of residuals is normal. To test for constant variance, a Breusch-Pagan test
was conducted. The null hypothesis is that variance is constant across groups. A
significance level of 0.05 was used for each test.
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Statistical Comparison: Research Question 3
Is there a preferred set of physical boundaries that improves responder efficiency?
To answer the third research question, the boundary set with the fewest
intersections was determined through a selection of the best method using a minimization
goal. The initial phase screens out any of the four boundary sets that have intersection
counts sufficiently large to be rejected as not the best set at an overall confidence level of
95%. The boundary set with the smallest mean number of intersections is compared to
each of the other three boundary sets. A given boundary set i is retained if the mean
number of intersections for that boundary set, 𝑣̅𝑖 , is sufficiently close to the smallest
sample mean number of intersections, 𝑣̅𝑗 . Equation 5 defines this sufficiently close
difference. 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is the margin of error for the two boundary sets i and j using a t-statistic
1

with [1 − (1 −

𝛼 3
)
2

, 𝑅0 − 1] degrees of freedom, where 𝑅0 is the sample size. The

practical difference is designated ϵ.
Equation 5

𝑣̅𝑖 − 𝑣̅𝑗 ≤ max{0, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 − 𝜖}
The number of replications to generate for the initial phase was determined by the
sampling plan based on practical and statistical differences for Research Question 1.
Additional data for the retained boundary sets will be generated as required in the
secondary phase to select-the-best or near-best boundary set at a confidence level of 95%.
A near-best boundary set would be a boundary set that may or may not be the absolute
best solution, but is at least within the range deemed to be practically significant.
Additionally, the method was repeated including the standard hazard zone intersections,
71

which resulted in a total of five systems to compare. The method outlined by Banks,
Carson, Nelson, and Nicol (2010) was used to perform the statistical calculations and
determine the final sample size.
Additionally, an ANOVA was conducted using the response variable of number
of intersections, a main effect of boundary set, and a blocking effect of scenario.
Scenario is defined as a random point location and hazard type combination. The
blocked ANOVA allows for greater power and insight into the question, because each
scenario is associated with four observations in the dataset – one for each boundary set in
the new hazard zones. Including scenario in the ANOVA reduces the variance due to
hazard and point location, such that effects from boundary set are clearer.
The select-the-best procedure uses the t-statistic, and the same assumptions must
be satisfied. The sample size is sufficient to rely on the Central Limit Theorem to ensure
normality, and the release locations were selected randomly within each region to satisfy
the condition of independence. The ANOVA must satisfy the assumptions noted for
Research Question 2; that is, normality of residuals, constant variance, and independence.

Summary
The methodology employed in this research study included three main stages.
First, the hazard release locations were selected through an analysis of historical data.
Second, a model was developed using ArcGIS® and python scripting to automate the
process of generating standard and new hazard zones and collecting the relevant data.
Third, prospective statistical analyses were described to answer the research questions.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter will discuss the results of the hazard zones simulation. Almost 1,000
points (release locations) were generated, resulting in almost 6,000 scenarios (location
and hazard). This produced 53,460 relevant statistics to conduct the analysis. This
chapter will answer each of the three research questions using the methodology outlined
in the statistical analysis section of Chapter III. The results show that standard initial
isolation and protective action zones do change when adapted to physical boundaries. In
general, both population and area change significantly from both a statistical and
practical perspective. Environment (urban, suburban, rural) has a strong effect on how
much hazard zones change, and location (Chicago, Denver, Houston) has a lesser but still
noticeable effect. Finally, the boundary set used to create the new hazard zones has a
statistically significant, but practically insignificant, effect on the number of intersections
in the hazard zone cordons.

Research Question 1
How do published emergency hazard zones for various CBRNE incidents
change when adapted to physical boundaries?
To answer Research Question 1, t-tests were conducted and confidence intervals
were constructed for the population difference, area difference, percent population
difference, and percent area difference. To mitigate concerns about independence, the
data was split by hazard. This resulted in 24 one-sided t-tests and 24 confidence
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intervals. A significance level of 0.05/24 = 0.002 for each test and confidence interval
was used. While this is probably overly conservative, the results were still significant
with high power. Summary statistics of the results are shown in Tables 10-16.
Confidence intervals were calculated for the median rather than the mean, because the
distributions were strongly skewed right. Minimums and maximums show the range of
extremes. The p-values shown in the tables are for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Paired
t-tests were also conducted with similar results; all 24 t-tests were statistically significant
at 0.002. Additionally, Figure 25 and Figure 26 show boxplots for the four response
variables by hazard to better illustrate the overall results. Forty six particularly large
outliers were removed from Figure 26 to more clearly show the boxplots.

Figure 25: Boxplots for Population and Area Difference
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Figure 26: Boxplots for Population and Area Percent Difference

Table 10: Summary Statistics (Anhydrous Ammonia)

Median
99.8% CI
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
P-value
Power

Population
Difference
449
350 – 542
0
8946
685

Area Difference
(square miles)
0.63
0.50 – 0.83
0.048
41.53
2.09

Percent Population
Difference
330
274 – 417
0
271,557
2,087

Percent Area
Difference
596
474 – 779
45.4
39,178
1,972

893

4.75

10,685

4,479

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
0.99999

< 0.0001
1
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Table 11: Summary Statistics (Chlorine)

Median
99.8% CI
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
P-value
Power

Population
Difference
3,648
3,219 – 4,045
1
17,730
3,869

Area Difference
(square miles)
4.24
3.43 – 5.01
0.54
48.26
6.26

Percent Population
Difference
43.6
35.7 – 51.1
0
7,544
130

Percent Area
Difference
79.49
64.35 – 93.94
10.09
904.3
117.2

3,464

7.22

384

135.3

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

Table 12: Summary Statistics (Sulfur Dioxide)

Median
99.8% CI
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
P-value
Power

Population
Difference
8,073
7,343 – 8,755
3
30,499
7,743

Area Difference
(square miles)
8.81
7.64 – 10.23
1.58
60.56
11.44

Percent Population
Difference
18.6
16.5 – 21.0
0
1,502
45.3

Percent Area
Difference
38.45
33.4 – 44.7
6.91
264
49.9

6381

10.14

93.8

44.3

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

Table 13: Summary Statistics (VX)

Median
99.8% CI
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
P-value
Power

Population
Difference
342
277 – 417
0
7,800
572

Area Difference
(square miles)
0.57
0.44 – 0.71
0.031
41.57
1.97

Percent Population
Difference
445
372 – 540
0
271,557
2,705

Percent Area
Difference
883.5
686 – 1,114
47.76
64,996
3,074

769

4.72

13,250

7,374

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1
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Table 14: Summary Statistics (Sarin)

Median
99.8% CI
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
P-value
Power

Population
Difference
2,071
1,689 – 2,369
0
12,722
2,328

Area Difference
(square miles)
2.44
2.14 – 2.80
0.26
47.40
4.32

Percent Population
Difference
75.6
65.5 – 95.0
0
114,932
436

Percent Area
Difference
135.4
118.6 – 155.8
14.4
2,634
240

2,237

6.29

4,097

349.3

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
0.91707

< 0.0001
1

Table 15: Summary Statistics (RDD)

Median
99.8% CI
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
P-value
Power

Population
Difference
1,517
1,243 – 1,744
0
10,028
1,830

Area Difference
(square miles)
1.88
1.56 – 2.15
0.17
47.87
3.60

Percent Population
Difference
122
102 – 155
0
172,564
578

Percent Area
Difference
203.6
169 – 233
18.7
5,182
390

1,840

5.96

5,607

644.9

< 0.0001
1

< 0.0001
1

0.0006
0.89956

< 0.0001
1

The median population differences range from 342 people (VX) to 8,073 people
(sulfur dioxide). Taking into account the confidence intervals, we would expect even the
smallest median population difference to be at least 277 people. This is significant both
statistically and compared to the nominal practical difference of 50 people. However,
due to the skewed nature of the distributions, 927 observations (almost 17% of all
observations) had population differences of less than 50 people. The smallest observed
population difference was 0, which occurred 57 times (1%); these observations were
mostly associated with small standard hazard zones or rural areas, and all occurred where
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the standard hazard zones affected zero population. The largest observed population
difference was 30,499. This occurred in suburban Houston with sulfur dioxide, which
has the largest standard hazard zone area. There were 38 observations (0.7%) with
population differences over 20,000 and 135 observations (2.5%) over 15,000.
The median area differences range from 0.57 (VX) to 8.81 (sulfur dioxide) square
miles. Taking into account the confidence intervals, we would expect even the smallest
median area difference to be at least 0.44 square miles. This is significant both
statistically and compared to the nominal practical difference of 0.35 square miles. The
smallest expansion observed was 0.031 square miles (VX in urban Houston), and the
maximum was approximately 60 square miles (sulfur dioxide in rural Denver). Similar to
the distribution of population differences, the distribution of area differences displays a
skewed shape. There are 887 observations (15% of all observations) with an area
difference less than the practical difference of 0.35 square miles and 1,201 (20%) with an
area difference less than 0.5 square miles. There are 47 observations (0.8%) with an area
difference greater than 40 square miles and 305 (5%) with a difference greater than 20
square miles.
Percent differences help describe changes relative to the standard hazard zones.
Median percent differences in population range from 18.6% (sulfur dioxide) to 445%
(VX). Some standard hazard zones did not affect any population; to avoid dividing by
zero when calculating percent differences, all standard population values were increased
by one. Still, many standard zones affected a very small number of people, which
resulted in some very large percent changes. The maximum percent difference in
population was 271,557%. This occurred for both VX and anhydrous ammonia in
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suburban Denver; the population increased from 0 (which was corrected to 1) to 2,716.
For 771 observations (13% of all observations), the percent change was less than 15%.
For 2,986 observations, or about half of all points, the population affected by the new
hazard zones more than doubled compared to the standard hazard zones.
The median percent differences in area range from 38.5% (sulfur dioxide) to
884% (VX). The largest percent area difference observed was almost 65,000% (VX in
rural Denver), and the smallest was 6.9% (sulfur dioxide in urban Chicago). There were
290 observations (5% of all observations) with a change of less than 15% and 1,380
(23%) with a change of less than 50%. For 3,573 observations (60%), the area affected
by the new hazard zones was at least twice the area affected by the standard hazard zone.
Correlations
Standard total hazard zone areas are listed in Table 16 to compare the area of the
six hazards’ standard zones. In general, the hazards starting with larger standard zones
are associated with larger population and area differences between the standard and new
zones. The hazards with larger standard zones also appear to have smaller percent
differences between the standard and new zones. This is supported by examining
correlations between the response summary statistics and the standard hazard zone areas.
Table 16: Standard Hazard Areas

Total Hazard Zone
Area (square miles)
0.106
5.336
22.91
0.064
1.800
0.924

Hazard
Anhydrous Ammonia
Chlorine
Sulfur Dioxide
VX
Sarin
RDD
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The first analysis (n=6) calculated the correlations between each hazard’s mean
or median value and the total hazard zone area. The medians were plotted against
standard zone areas with linear regression lines fitted to each plot in Figure 27, where the
shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval about the fit line. For the population and
area difference variables, there are strong positive correlations between the medians and
means and the standard hazard zone areas, which means that larger original protective
distances result in more people and area affected. For the percent population and percent
area differences, there are moderate negative correlations between the medians and
means and the standard hazard zone areas, which means that larger original protective
distances generally result in smaller percent increases in people and area affected.

Figure 27: Population and Area Differences vs. Standard Zone Areas
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Table 17: Standard Area Correlations with Summary Statistics

Standard Hazard Zone Area
Linear
Square Root Logarithmic
0.9755
0.9996
0.9666
0.9998
0.9710
0.9999
0.9674
0.9998
-0.5683
-0.9427
-0.5548
-0.9393
-0.5417
-0.9246
-0.4900
-0.8974

Population Difference – Median
Population Difference – Mean
Area Difference – Median
Area Difference – Mean
Percent Population Difference – Median
Percent Population Difference – Mean
Percent Area Difference – Median
Percent Area Difference – Mean

To further investigate these relationships, correlations between each of the
response variables and the standard hazard zone areas were calculated using the entire
dataset (n=5,940). The data were plotted against standard zone areas with linear
regression lines fitted to each plot in Figure 28. Additionally, the same transformations
were conducted on the complete dataset: square root for population and area difference
and logarithmic for percent differences. These transformations increased the correlation
magnitudes. The linear, square root, and logarithmic correlations are shown in Table 18.
For the population and area difference, moderate positive correlations exist with the
standard hazard area, which means that larger original protective distances result in more
people and area affected, but the association is weaker than the first analysis that used
only the summary statistics. For the percent differences, weak (but still statistically
significant) negative correlations exist with the standard hazard area, which means that
larger original protective distances tend to result in smaller percent increases in people
and area affected, but the association is not nearly as strong and may not be useful. The
summary statistics and both sets of correlations suggest that there is a significant
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relationship between the response variables and the standard hazard areas, but there is
also considerable variation in the data.

Figure 28: Population and Area Percent Differences vs. Standard Zone Areas

Table 18: Standard Area Correlations with Complete Sample Data

Standard Hazard Zone Area
Linear
Square Root Logarithmic
0.5854
0.6056
0.4183
0.4323
-0.0748
-0.1266
-0.1511
-0.2768

Population Difference – All Data
Area Difference – All Data
Percent Population Difference – All Data
Percent Area Difference – All Data

Discussion
Paired differences for population and area, as well as percent changes, were found
to be statistically and practically significant for each hazard. This analysis found a
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general relationship between standard hazard zone size and the population and area
differences affected by the new hazard zones. Larger standard hazard zones tended to
grow more in terms of the absolute population and area affected, but the percent changes
tended to be smaller. For example, sulfur dioxide has the largest standard hazard area at
almost 23 square miles, had a median population increase of over 8,000 people and
18.6%, and experienced a median area growth of 8.8 square miles and 38.5%.
Comparatively, VX has the smallest standard hazard area at 0.064 square miles, saw a
median population increase of 342 people and 445%, and a median area growth of 0.6
square miles and 884%. This relationship makes sense, because each zone expands in all
directions until a new cordon can be constructed using physical boundaries, resulting in a
larger total area affected by the new zone when the initial zone is large. Larger areas are
likely to affect more people, especially in populated areas. The percent change represents
the increase relative to standard size and shows the opposite relationship, likely because
the standard zone values serve as the denominators. There was, however, significant
variation in the data, such that these relationships did not hold at every data point, and not
every point had a practically significant change from the standard hazard zones. This
research shows that expanding zones to nearby physical boundaries makes a significant
difference in how many people and how much area are likely to impacted by protective
action orders, such as evacuation or shelter-in-place, but the specific impact depends on
the hazard and location.
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Research Question 2
What effects do different environments and locations have on emergency
hazard zones when the zones are adapted to physical boundaries?
To answer Research Question 2, two ANOVAs were conducted with response
variables of population difference and area difference. A full-factorial design with
hazard, city, and environment resulted in seven factors in each model; after examining
the initial model, some interactions were removed. Assumptions of constant variance,
normality, and independence were considered.
Assumptions
The residual by predicted plot for both ANOVAs showed highly non-constant
variance. To deal with this deviation, a square root transformation was applied to the
response variables. The breusch-pagan tests resulted in very small p-values. However,
the plots with the transformed variables show significantly less variation in the variances
and little to no pattern (see Figure 29). Because the ANOVA is fairly robust against
deviations of non-constant variance, and the sample sizes are equal, this deviation is
unlikely to cause any issues related to statistical validity.

Figure 29: Residuals vs Predicted (Square Root Transformations)
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The distribution of residuals shows a generally normal shape for both ANOVAs.
The distributions are shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31. While the KSL goodness of fit
tests resulted in p-values of 0.01, which is less than the significance level of 0.05, this is
likely due to the large sample size. The distribution has a single, central peak and mostly
normal appearance, and the ANOVA is robust against deviations of non-normality, so
this assumption is sufficiently met.

Figure 30: Population Difference ANOVA Residuals

Figure 31: Area Difference ANOVA Residuals

Independence was established through the design of the simulation and ANOVA.
The simulation randomly generated spill locations. Six hazard zones were generated for
each spill location – one for each hazard. To mitigate concerns about independence and
to provide more insight into the effects of interest, hazard was included as an effect.
85

Population Difference ANOVA
Once assumptions were adequately met, the effects in the models were
considered. Because the sample size is large, effects have a tendency to produce
statistically significant results with very small p-values. Therefore, each interaction
effect was examined visually to determine if a meaningful interaction was present. For
the population difference ANOVA, two interactions were removed. The three-way
interaction, while statistically significant, showed little variation in the least squares (LS)
means plot. Additionally, City x Hazard had a comparatively low F Ratio (6.4) and
displayed little interaction in the LS means plot, which is shown in Figure 32. The Rsquared value decreased only a small amount (0.8606 to 0.8543) when removing these
interactions.

Figure 32: LS Means Plot of City x Hazard for Population Difference ANOVA

Removing two interactions left five factors consisting of three main effects and
two interactions in the final model. A summary of the effects included is shown in Table
19. Environment appears to have a particularly pronounced effect on the response
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variable of population difference. The LS means plot is shown in Figure 33, in which the
error bars represent the 95% confidence interval about the mean. Rural areas are
associated with significantly less growth in the population affected by the new hazard
zones compared to the standard hazard zones. Suburban regions are associated with the
greatest growth in population affected. A Tukey test reveals that all three levels are
significantly different.
Table 19: Effect Tests for Population Difference ANOVA

Source
Hazard
Environment
City
City x Environment
Environment x Hazard

Degrees of
Freedom
5
2
2
4
10

Sum of
Squares
2,256,778
2,757,347
26,710
141,006
665,967

F Ratio

P-value

2,677
8,177
79
209
395

< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001

Figure 33: LS Means Plot of Environment for Population Difference ANOVA

As expected, hazard also has a clear effect on the response variable of population
difference. The LS means plot is shown in Figure 34. Sulfur dioxide, which has the
largest standard hazard zone, shows the greatest difference in the populations affected by
new and standard zones. VX has the smallest standard hazard zone and shows the least
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difference between populations affected by new and standard zones. According to the
Tukey test, all six hazards are statistically different.

Figure 34: LS Means Plot of Hazard for Population Difference ANOVA

The city has a less pronounced, but still significant, effect on the response. The
LS means plot is shown in Figure 35. The difference between Chicago and Denver is
statistically significant, but appears to be small. Houston shows a larger growth in
population than Chicago and Denver. There are many possible explanations for this
difference. For example, city planning strategies might result in different road networks
or geographic distributions of residents.

Figure 35: LS Means Plot of City for Population Difference ANOVA
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Two interactions of interest were included in the ANOVA. The LS means plots
for City x Environment and Environment x Hazard are shown in Figure 36 and Figure 37.
While the differences between the rural regions for all three cities are statistically
insignificant, the differences between the cities in suburban and urban regions are
significant. In both cases, Houston shows more population growth than Denver.
However, Chicago shows the least population growth in suburban regions, but the most
population growth in urban regions. Rural regions also show little to no significant
difference across the six hazards; all six hazards result in small population increases as
the hazard zones are expanded to nearby physical boundaries in rural regions. There is
much more variation across hazards in urban and suburban regions. Both urban and
suburban regions follow a pattern similar to that shown in the main effect of hazard with
suburban regions having slightly larger population differences than urban regions.

Figure 36: LS Means Plot of City x Environment for Population Difference ANOVA
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Figure 37: LS Means Plot of Environment x Hazard for Population Difference ANOVA

Area Difference ANOVA
For the area difference ANOVA, one interaction, City x Hazard, was not
significant, so it was removed. While statistically significant, two other interactions,
Environment x Hazard and the three way interaction City x Environment x Hazard, had
comparatively small F Ratios. The LS means plots showed some interactions, but not
strong interactions. As a result of this investigation, those three interactions were
removed from the model. The R-squared value decreased a small amount (0.7354 to
0.7136) after these interactions were removed. The remaining effects in the final model
are shown in Table 20.
Table 20: Effect Tests for Area Difference ANOVA

Source
Hazard
Environment
City
City x Environment

Degrees of
Freedom
5
2
2
4

Sum of
Squares
2,980.2
3,588.1
99.4
594.9
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F Ratio

P-value

1,211.6
3,646.7
101.1
302.3

< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001

In particular, the environment seems to have a strong effect on how much the new
hazard zones grow from the standard hazard zone areas. Hazards in rural environments
display the largest area growth, and urban environments display the smallest area growth.
Figure 38 shows the LS means plot. The Tukey test reveals that all three are significantly
different. This result is not surprising, because rural environments typically have far less
roads than urban or suburban environments. Hazard zones in rural environments were
required to expand significantly farther to match nearby roads than hazard zones in more
built-up environments.

Figure 38: LS Means Plot of Environment for Area Difference ANOVA

The main effect of city also contributes to the area difference, but the effect
appears to be smaller relative to environment and hazard. Houston and Chicago are not
statistically different from each other, but both are statistically different from Denver.
The LS means plot is shown in Figure 39. On average, hazard releases in Denver
resulted in a larger expansion from the standard to new zone than in Houston or Chicago.
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Figure 39: LS Means Plot of City for Area Difference ANOVA

As expected, the final main effect of hazard also shows a significant effect on the
response of area difference. The LS means plot is shown in Figure 40. Tukey tests show
that VX and anhydrous ammonia, which have the two smallest standard hazard distances,
are not statistically different, but the rest of the hazards are distinct. Larger standard
hazard zones are associated with larger area differences. City x Environment is the only
interaction of notable interest. The LS means plot is shown in Figure 41. The plot shows
that there is an interaction between cities and environments. For example, the rural
Denver region displays a larger mean than the rural Chicago region, but the suburban
Denver region has a smaller mean than the suburban Chicago region. There are many
possible explanations for the presence of this interaction, such as politics, infrastructure,
climate, economics, and terrain.
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Figure 40: LS Means Plot of Hazard for Area Difference ANOVA

Figure 41: LS Means Plot of City x Environment for Area Difference ANOVA

Discussion
For both response variables (population and area difference), hazard,
environment, and city were all significant effects. Hazard was expected to produce a
significant effect, because the standard hazard distances vary across the six hazards.
Environment exhibited strong, but different, effects on the response variables. City
appeared to have a smaller, but still significant, effect on the response variables.
The environment had a discernable effect on the response variables. For
population differences, rural regions showed the smallest values, and suburban regions
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showed the highest values. For area differences, rural regions showed the largest values,
and urban regions showed the smallest values. This result makes sense, because rural
areas have smaller populations and fewer physical boundaries, so the zones grew
significantly to reach nearby boundaries, but still did not affect large numbers of people.
Conversely, suburban regions have large residential populations and many roads, so the
new zones tend to affect significantly more people even if they don’t grow as much in
area. Urban regions also have large populations, but often not as large as suburban
regions, and urban regions often have even more roads in a grid layout. Environment
also interacted significantly with both city and hazard. For population difference, no
difference between cities in rural regions was found, whereas for area difference, the
greatest variation between cities was found in rural regions. This suggests that
population distributions in rural regions may be similar from one location to another, but
the physical environment and layout of roads may differ based on local practices,
policies, terrain, or other factors. Hazard made little difference in rural regions, but
caused significant variation in suburban and urban regions. Because rural regions have
fewer roads, the hazard zones generally have to expand farther. Thus, the amount of
expansion is more robust against variations in input hazard distances. Comparatively, in
urban and suburban regions, even slight differences in standard hazard zones may push
the new hazard zones to different boundaries.
City also had a significant effect on the response variable, but this is likely due to
underlying aspects of the cities studied, such as road network or population density. For
population differences, Houston was associated with larger values, and Denver was
associated with smaller values. While not tested across cities, this effect may be due to
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population density differences. All three cities have similar rural population densities,
and there was no detectable difference in population growth across cities in rural regions.
However, Houston has the largest suburban population and showed the highest
population growth in suburban regions followed by Denver and then Chicago. Similarly,
Chicago has the densest urban area and showed the most population growth in urban
regions followed by Houston and then Denver. For area differences, Denver was
associated with values larger than Chicago and Houston. This effect was pronounced for
rural environments and practically non-existent for urban and suburban environments,
which suggests that the main effect may be a function of regional rural road network
differences. These differences across the three studied cities show that the behavior of
expanding hazard zones is not always consistent between large U.S. cities and may
depend on additional underlying variables.

Research Question 3
Is there a preferred set of physical boundaries that improves responder
efficiency?
To answer Research Question 3, a select-the-best procedure was performed
among the four new boundary sets with a goal to minimize the number of intersections.
The number of intersections was used as a proxy variable for responder efficiency with
the assumption that more intersections correlates to more complex cordons. The
procedure was repeated including the standard hazard zone intersections for a total of five
boundary sets. For the four boundary sets, the procedure was also conducted on each
environment (urban, suburban, rural) subset. An indifference threshold of 15
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intersections and an overall significance level of 0.05 were chosen as described in
Chapter III. Additionally, a blocked ANOVA was used to analyze the data.
Select the Best
When comparing all five boundary sets, the select-the-best procedure found that
the standard hazard zones have the fewest intersections. Because standard hazard zones
do not conform to nearby physical boundaries, intersections for the standard hazard zones
were determined using slightly different rules. Roads, rivers, and railroads that cross the
cordons were counted. For the new hazard zones, which do conform to physical
boundaries, every intersection was counted. This effectively includes roads, rivers, and
railroads (using the appropriate combination for a given boundary set) that cross the
cordon, as well as roads, rivers, and railroads that intersect along the cordon. Also, more
intersections can be expected in the new zones, because the cordons were forced to
incorporate physical boundaries, whereas the standard cordons were entirely independent
from physical boundaries. Because of this difference in the specific measure used as
intersections, this procedure was performed simply for purposes of general comparison.
The means and standard deviations for each boundary set are shown in Table 21; the
selected boundary set is highlighted.
Table 21: Number of Intersections by Boundary Set

Mean Number
of Intersections
Standard
Deviation

Standard
Zones

Roads

Roads and
Railroads

Roads and
Rivers

Roads,
Railroads,
and Rivers

64.81

162.3

158.9

151.6

150.0

82.97

160.3

157.4

149.9

149.1
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When comparing only the four boundary sets applied to the new hazard zones, the
select-the-best method found that using the combination of roads, railroads, and rivers
(RRR) resulted in the fewest intersections or within 15 of the fewest intersections. A
summary of the results is shown in Table 22, which follows the methodology and
notation used in Chapter III. Wi,RRR is the margin of error calculated for the RRR
boundary set and the boundary set being compared. Each boundary set is compared to
the boundary set with the lowest mean, so a compared boundary set must be sufficiently
close to the RRR boundary set to be retained. The third row in Table 22 is the value
compared against each boundary set’s mean, where ϵ is the practical difference or
indifference level and is set at 15 intersections. A value larger than the mean causes the
boundary set to be rejected. Because the mean number of intersections is greater than the
value calculated in the third row for each of the boundary sets, only the boundary set with
the lowest mean number of intersections is retained and thus determined to be the best or
near-best system. This system is the roads, railroads, and rivers boundary set.
Table 22: Select-the-Best

Mean Number of
Intersections, Yi
Wi,RRR
YRRR + max{0, Wi,RRR – ϵ}

Roads

Roads and
Railroads

Roads and
Rivers

Roads,
Railroads,
and Rivers

162.3

158.9

151.6

150.0

8.135
149.98

8.058
149.98

7.858
149.98

The procedure was repeated for each environment. In the rural and suburban
environments, the roads, railroads, and rivers boundary set was again selected as the best
or near-best. In the urban environment, the select-the-best procedure could not determine
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whether the roads, railroads, and rivers boundary set or the roads and rivers boundary set
was the best or near-best. The results are shown in Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25.
The hazard zones in rural environments are associated with substantially fewer
intersections than those in suburban and rural environments. This makes sense, because
rural environments tend to have far less roads and railroads than urban and suburban
environments.
Table 23: Select-the-Best (Rural)

Mean Number of
Intersections
Wi,RRR
YRRR + max{0, Wi,RRR – ϵ}

Roads

Roads and
Railroads

Roads and
Rivers

Roads,
Railroads,
and Rivers

72.03

70.56

65.78

65.24

5.732
65.24

5.643
65.24

5.163
65.24

Table 24: Select-the-Best (Suburban)

Mean Number of
Intersections
Wi,RRR
YRRR + max{0, Wi,RRR – ϵ}

Roads

Roads and
Railroads

Roads and
Rivers

Roads,
Railroads,
and Rivers

206.3

199.5

183.7

180.2

14.21
180.2

13.99
180.2

13.34
180.2

Table 25: Select-the-Best (Urban)

Mean Number of
Intersections
Wi,RRR
YRRR + max{0, Wi,RRR – ϵ}

Roads

Roads and
Railroads

Roads and
Rivers

Roads,
Railroads,
and Rivers

208.5

206.6

205.2

204.5

16.29
205.8

16.23
205.7

16.11
205.6
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At a practical difference ϵ of 15, the rural and urban environments do not produce
a significant difference between the boundary sets. The suburban environment results in
a practically significant difference between the means of the first two and last two
boundary sets, as shown in Table 24. In other words, within a suburban environment,
there may be a meaningful improvement from the boundary sets of roads and
roads/railroads to the boundary sets of roads/rivers and roads/railroads/rivers. If a
practical difference of 0 is used instead of 15, the results change, indicating that there are
some statistical differences that may not be practically significant. In the rural
environment, only the roads boundary set is rejected. In the suburban environment, the
best boundary set is determined to be either roads and rivers or roads, railroads, and
rivers. In the urban environment, no boundary set can be confidently selected as best or
near-best.
Blocked ANOVA
A blocked ANOVA was also run using the four boundary sets (i.e., roads; roads
and railroads; roads and rivers; roads, railroads, and rivers) for the new hazard zones in
order to reduce the variance due to the hazard and randomly generated spill point. The
response variable was the number of intersections, and the factors were the boundary set
and the scenario. A scenario is a combination of a single randomly generated release
point and hazard. Four observations are associated with each scenario – one for each
boundary set. This design in simulation means that each scenario is a block with four
observations. The results are shown in Table 26, and the effect tests are shown in Table
27. The model has an R-squared of 0.9884, which is considerably larger than the
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unblocked ANOVA’s R-squared of 0.0011, indicating that scenario does have a
considerable effect on the number of intersections. The Tukey test for the blocked
ANOVA reveals a statistically significant difference between each boundary set. The LS
means plot is shown in Figure 42. However, the largest mean number of intersections
(roads at 162) is within 15 of the smallest mean number of intersections (roads, railroads,
and rivers at 150). Therefore, this research shows that the selection of a boundary set can
influence the number of intersections, but the difference may not be large enough to be
practically important.
Table 26: Blocked ANOVA for Intersections

Source
Model
Error
Total

Degrees of
Freedom
5,942
17,817
23,759

Sum of
Squares
559,498,707
6,548,743
566,047,450

Mean
Square
94,160
367.6

F Ratio

P-value

256.18

< 0.0001

Table 27: Effect Tests for Blocked ANOVA

Source
Boundary Set
Scenario

Degrees of
Freedom
3
5,939

Sum of
Squares
612,904
55,8885,802

F Ratio

P-value

555.84
256.03

< 0.0001
< 0.0001

Figure 42: LS Means Plot for Intersections ANOVA
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To verify the validity of the ANOVA, the assumptions of normality, constant
variance, and independence were considered. The residuals fail the KSL goodness of fit
test with a p-value of 0.01. However, like the ANOVAs in Research Question 2, the
sample size is very large (23,760), so any deviation from normality is likely to result in a
low p-value. The distribution of residuals (see Figure 43) shows a fairly normal
appearance with a single, central peak. To check the assumption of constant variance, the
residuals were plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 44). The scatter of points
appears to be within a reasonable amount of variation to accept this condition. Finally,
independence is satisfied by the design of the simulation. Scenarios are not expected to
be independent from number of intersections, leading to the blocked design. Scenarios
are independent, because the point locations were selected randomly. The ANOVA
adequately meets the three assumptions to be considered statistically valid.

Figure 43: Distribution of Residuals for Intersections ANOVA
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Figure 44: Residuals vs. Predicted for Intersections ANOVA

Discussion
Many factors can affect responder efficiency and will vary based on the
conditions at any given incident site, so a proxy variable of number of intersections in the
hazard cordon was used to represent efficiency consistently. Through a selection of the
best method and blocked ANOVA, the boundary set using all three physical boundary
types (roads, rivers, railroads) was determined to have the fewest intersections. The
boundary set with roads and rivers was close to the lowest mean number of intersections,
suggesting that rivers may be an important factor influencing the number of
intersections. However, with a difference in means of less than 15 intersections between
the highest and lowest means for all cases except suburban regions, the difference was
not considered practically significant. This suggests that as long as responders use roads
to establish boundaries, there is unlikely to be a significant increase or decrease in
efficiency by selecting different boundaries to use. While there may exist a boundary set
with a significantly lower number of intersections by using different boundary types not
considered here, the choice between the four boundary sets used in this research is
probably unimportant.
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Summary
This chapter discussed the results of the research simulation by using the
methodology described in the statistical analysis section of Chapter III. Confidence
intervals and correlations revealed that paired differences for population and area, as well
as percent changes, were statistically and practically significant. Depending on the
specific hazard, median increases in population ranged from 342 to 8,073 people, and
median increases in area ranged from 0.064 to 8.8 square miles. The correlations showed
that larger standard hazard zones tend to increase the number of people and size of area
affected more than small standard hazard zones. Conversely, smaller standard hazard
zones tend to result in larger percent changes in population and area affected. Two
ANOVAs explained the impact of rural, urban, or suburban environment, as well as city,
on population and area differences. City, and especially environment, exhibited
significant effects on how much the population and area changed with the new hazard
zones. Rural regions generally displayed smaller population increases and larger area
increases than urban and suburban regions. Additionally, several interactions between
the effects of city, environment, and hazard were found to be of interest. A select-thebest procedure and a blocked ANOVA found statistically significant, but practically
insignificant, differences among the four boundary sets used to generate new hazard
zones. If roads are initially used to set up cordons, adding railroads and/or rivers to the
cordon boundary makes little difference in the number of intersections that need to be
controlled in the hazard zone boundary.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This research investigated and characterized initial emergency CBRN hazard
zones in real world scenarios by accounting for the surrounding physical environment.
These new hazard zones were matched to nearby roads, railroads, and rivers and then
compared to the standard initial hazard zones as defined by the Emergency Response
Guidebook (ERG) (DOT et al., 2012) for chemical accidents and attacks and Musolino et
al. (2013) for radiological hazards. The comparison considered the population and area
that would be affected by the hazard zones. Additionally, responder efficiency was
compared across different combinations of physical boundaries. This chapter draws
conclusions from the results of the research, discusses the significance of the research,
acknowledges limitations, and provides recommendations for future research.

Conclusions of Research
This research is the first of its kind to evaluate the implications of expanding
hazard zones to physical boundaries. Three research questions were answered to quantify
the effects of expanding hazard zones to nearby physical boundaries, such as roads,
railroads, and rivers. Standard hazard zones, as defined by the 2012 ERG (DOT et al.)
and the recommendations from Musolino et al. (2013), were expanded until a complete
cordon could be constructed using only roads, railroads, and rivers. By allowing the
hazard zones to only expand, no additional risk was incurred by the population from the
CBRN hazard. The study included six hazards and three cities to provide a range of data.
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Anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, and sulfur dioxide represented the technological hazard as
toxic inhalation hazards that are commonly used in industry and have historically been
involved in releases that require an emergency response. VX, sarin, and RDDs
represented the human-caused hazards as chemical warfare agents and radiological
hazards that could be used in terrorism. Chicago, Denver, and Houston were selected as
metropolitan areas that experience a high number of chemical incidents. To explore the
effects of the type of environment on hazard zones, rural, suburban, and urban regions
were selected for each of the three metropolitan areas. In total, nine regions and six
hazards were evaluated. A simulation was developed using python and ArcGIS® to
automate the creation of standard hazard zones and new hazard zones expanded to
physical boundaries and to calculate the relevant statistics using a paired differences
approach. The simulation randomly generated almost 1,000 points within the 9 regions.
With 6 hazards at each point, almost 6,000 specific scenarios were generated.
Additionally, responder efficiency was explored through a proxy variable that represents
the complexity of the cordon. The number of intersections in the hazard zone cordons,
defined as any connection between two or more physical boundaries at any point on the
cordon, was counted. More intersections represent higher cordon complexity and a
degradation to responder efficiency. The simulation was repeated at each scenario for
each of four different boundary sets. The original boundary set used roads, railroads, and
rivers. The additional boundary sets used roads only, roads and railroads, or roads and
rivers. The simulation produced five output statistics relevant to the research: the
difference in population affected by the new and standard hazard zones (where
population data is sourced from U.S. Census Bureau data), the difference in area covered
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by the new and standard hazard zones, the percent population difference, the percent area
difference, and the number of intersections in the cordon boundaries.
The data were first analyzed by constructing confidence intervals and examining
correlations to determine how much the affected population and area increased for each
of the six hazards. Each dataset using a different hazard showed a significant increase in
the population affected, area affected, and percent changes in population and area. A
general trend exists where hazards with larger standard distances result in greater
absolute population and area increases, but smaller percent increases. For example, VX
has the smallest standard hazard area at 0.064 square miles and had median increases
from standard to new hazard zones of 342 people (445% change) and 0.6 square miles
(884% change). Sulfur dioxide has the largest standard hazard area at approximately 23
square miles and had median increases of over 8,000 people (18.6% change) and 8.8
square miles (38.5% change). The other hazards (anhydrous ammonia, chlorine, sarin,
and radiological dispersal devices) followed a similar trend. Furthermore, this
relationship between standard hazard areas and response variables appears to follow a
square root curve for population and area differences and a logarithmic curve for percent
changes. Next, different environments and locations were considered to analyze their
effects on hazard zones that are adapted to physical boundaries. Using the nine different
regions across three cities and three environments, ANOVAs were conducted for
population and area differences. Both environment and city had a significant effect.
Rural regions tended to result in larger area differences, but smaller population
differences than urban and suburban regions. The differences between the three cities
were less substantial than those from the environment, but the differences still show that
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the particular city where an incident occurs can impact how big the hazard zones are and
how many people are affected. Finally, four different physical boundaries were analyzed
to determine if a particular combination of boundaries results in improved responder
efficiency. The select-the-best procedure and blocked ANOVA found statistically
significant, but practically insignificant, differences between the boundary sets. The
boundary set using all the boundaries included in the research (roads, railroads, and
rivers) had the fewest intersections, which is interpreted as the highest responder
efficiency. However, this was only 12 intersections less than the boundary set with the
most intersections – an 8% difference.
The results show that responders employing the method in this experiment to set
up cordons will, on average, tend to experience a significant increase in population (340
to 8,000 more people, depending on hazard) and area (0.6 to 8.8 square miles) affected by
their decisions. Because there is variation in the results, responders should expect to
sometimes encounter situations without a significant increase in population or area, but
sometimes deal with an extremely large and difficult to manage increase. The amount of
increased impact also depends on the environment and city. Therefore, responders
should also gather information about the specific location and be aware of the significant
difference these characteristics can make. Based on this research, responders concerned
about efficiency shouldn’t dedicate resources to determining which boundary types to
consider. There are likely more important considerations, such as the responder’s
preference, ease of designating and communicating specific boundaries for their
particular community, and expected effort to maintain control over their resources.
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Significance of Research
This research shows that hazard zones adapted to match physical boundaries are
significantly different than the established hazard zone guidelines in terms of population
affected and area covered. This finding has a number of implications. While the
generated hazard zones matched to physical boundaries are not a perfect representation of
reality, they are probably closer to reality than the simple circles and rectangles of the
standard guidelines that do not account for the physical environment. The standard
guidelines exist to be applicable in any environment, but implementation requires an
additional step of adapting to the real world location. By incorporating some specific
elements of the physical environment, this research produced hazard zones and data that
may be more representative of the populations and areas impacted by a CBRN incident.
If this methodology is incorporated into response modeling software, responders and
researchers would have a model available that may more accurately reflects reality.
Additionally, this study explicitly restricted hazard zones from shrinking. While it is
possible that responders could choose to reduce hazard distances based on the specific
scenario, the phenomenon of creeping conservatism indicates that responders and other
decision makers are more likely to increase hazard distances when implementing
cordons, evacuation orders, and shelter-in-place notices. It is important for responders,
researchers, and community leaders to understand the effects of applying simple
guidelines to real world situations, as well as complicating factors such as creeping
conservatism and shadow evacuation, so that impacts to the local population and
response agencies are not significantly under-estimated.
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Additionally, the type of environment and even the specific city may affect the
degree to which real world cordons differ from the standard guidelines. Rural
environments tend to lead to particularly large zones, but may not impact that many more
people. As urban and suburban environments are expanded to more realistic boundaries,
the population affected can rapidly increase even if the total area is not much larger. The
effects in rural regions do not depend on hazard, but in urban and suburban region, the
hazard can make a significant difference in how large a cordon is and how many people
will need to take protective action.
The size of hazard zones and the population within the hazard zones greatly
influence a response effort. People within hazard zones must be notified of the incident
and directed to take protective actions. Sheltering-in-place in particular requires
continual communication with the population to provide appropriate updates throughout
the incident duration. Evacuation orders should include routes and timing, as well as the
defined area to be evacuated. As seen in Graniteville, SC, the more clearly the area can
be communicated, the more likely the population is to comply (Mitchell et al, 2005).
Hazard zones generated by this research may be easier to communicate, because they use
easily defined boundaries. Also, more people evacuating increases the evacuation
burden. This includes traffic congestion, time to evacuate, manpower to direct evacuees,
mass care facilities and resources, and increased risk of evacuation-related accidents.
The size of the hazard zone also impacts the response effort and the surrounding
community. A larger hazard zone is typically harder to manage and requires more
responders to establish and maintain. The hazard zone also affects the surrounding
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community, because access to that area is restricted. For example, through-traffic must
be re-routed around the cordon.
For the responder concerned with efficiency of cordon set-up and control, this
research suggests that the combination of physical boundaries used for hazard zones is
usually not important. However, the experiment only considered roads, railroads, and
rivers; other physical boundaries may enable or hinder efficiency.
The results of this thesis also have implications for the research community.
Researchers seeking to evaluate effects of various CBRN scenarios tend to rely on hazard
distance guidelines or plume modeling software. In reality, those zones do not account
for the physical environment surrounding the incident site. Conclusions drawn and
decisions made based on such hazard zones are limited by the assumption that the
underlying environment doesn’t significantly affect the results. This research shows that
surrounding physical boundaries can be a significant factor in the determining the effects
of hazard zones.

Limitations of Research
Five limitations were noted in Chapter I. First, individual responders will often
make different decisions about cordon set-up in the same situation based on their
experiences, training, and judgments. Many factors influence incidents, and any of those
factors can lead to different decisions, as well. Second, this research considered only six
hazards and three cities to generate the data. Third, the ERG is mostly designed for
accidental releases based on typical spill amounts and conditions, so worst-case scenarios
might require larger hazard distances. The ERG similarly accounts for chemicals used as
110

weapons by considering reasonable amounts and capabilities. Another limitation of the
ERG is that the toxic inhalation hazards section used in this research to determine hazard
distances only considers the airborne contamination and not environmental impacts of
ground or water contamination. Fourth, only roads, railroads, and rivers were used as
physical boundaries when many other possible physical boundaries exist in various
locations. Fifth, populations were estimated using the U.S. Census Bureau’s residential
block counts, meaning that variation in the actual presence of people at the time of an
incident is ignored.
Additionally, the GIS algorithm was limited by the road data obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Geological Survey. The data had an insufficient level of
detail in the designations between types of roads to adequately distinguish between major
roads, city roads, and minor roads such as alleys. With this additional detail, the
algorithm could have been modified to use only certain types of roads.
Another limitation of the research is due to the algorithm itself. The code requires
the new hazard zones to expand until a complete polygon consisting of roads, railroads,
and rivers can be drawn. This can be problematic for release points near large open areas
without those boundaries. For example, Lake Michigan is a very large open area near
Chicago. To avoid this problem consistently, the program restricted the use of points that
would cause an expansion into the lake.

Recommendations for Future Research
There are ample opportunities for further research related to this thesis.
Addressing the limitations would allow for additional conclusions to be drawn. If type of
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road can be distinguished to a sufficient level of detail, then the algorithm could be
refined to target the roads more likely to be used as cordon boundaries. Additionally,
varying options could be provided to allow for different rules to be applied; for example,
all roads, only major roads, or a specific subset of roads could be selected. Greater
options in physical boundaries would also allow for further comparisons to be conducted
regarding responder efficiency.
This research found some relationships between the hazard type, environment,
and city. The experiment could be replicated for more and different areas, with different
hazards, and/or in different types of environments. Additional factors, such as terrain,
weather patterns over time, varying wind speeds, population density, and road network
characteristics, could also be added.
Another opportunity for further research is the development of a field-ready tool
for responders. The algorithm could be further refined to allow for more options, the
ability to easily make adjustments to the recommended cordon boundaries based on
responder judgment, and the integration with other incident management information.
For example, this research required cordons to exactly match physical boundaries; the
field-ready tool could present the automatically generated zones on a local map and then
allow the responder to decide to cut across an open field on one side of the zone instead.
A small city or Department of Defense installation may serve as a good case study
environment to research and test this type of emergency response tool. An Air Force
installation in particular has generally consistent and clearly defined roles,
responsibilities, authorities, and protocols that might build a framework for such a tool.

112

This study investigated responder efficiency with a simple, single parameter,
proxy variable. In reality, other factors influence the efficiency of a response effort, such
as available manpower and equipment, time of day and year, location, support
agreements, and the quality of plans and checklists. Further research could explore other
potential elements of responder efficiency, develop a method to measure those elements,
and maximize or balance overall efficiency of incident scene management.
To better capture the number of people directly impacted by CBRN hazard zones,
the actual population present in the area could be estimated. The researcher could
account for different areas (residential, industrial, offices, retail, recreational,
transportation, etc.), times of day or night, days of the week, and seasons. This would
provide further insight into the true impact of an event and may more accurately represent
differences in environment (rural, suburban, and urban).
Many factors influence responder decisions throughout an incident, including the
initial phase and cordon set-up stage. Further research could identify and characterize
these factors. This would enable the development of more realistic models and decisionsupport tools for the responder and researcher. Inquiries regarding which factors are
most influential or how to optimize the cordon set-up process could be investigated.

Summary
This research enhanced understanding of initial response operations to a CBRNE
incident by investigating and characterizing how initial hazard zones change in a real
world environment that accounts for physical boundaries. Background information
provided the motivation and research questions for the research effort. Next, a literature
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review informed and framed the research questions and methodology. To explore how
hazard zones change when adapted to nearby physical boundaries in a variety of locations
and for six different hazards, a simulation collected data through the generation and
calculation of standard and new hazard zones. The analysis of the results revealed
significant differences in the population and area affected by new hazard zones compared
to standard hazard zones, as well as significant effects of the specific environment and
city where the hazard was located. Additionally, the particular combination of physical
boundaries used in creating hazard zones was not found to influence responder
efficiency. Finally, this chapter provided a brief review of the research and its
conclusions, the significance of the results, limitations of the study, and several
suggestions for future research.
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Appendix A: Python Scripts for Simulation
A1. Data Initialization
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------# GIS_data_setup.py
# Micki Sundheim
# Updated on: 2015-12-29
# Description: set up GIS shapefiles: census block data, Roads, RRiver, RRail, R
RR
6. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------7.
8. import arcpy
9. import sys
10.
11. ## USER INPUT VARIABLES
12. gdb_name = 'TX'
13. box = "box" #regions in which random points will be generated
14. clipper = "Clipper" #large polygon around general area of interest
15. box_Buffer = "box_Buffer" #smaller polygon(s) around more specific area of inte
rest
16.
17. ## DEFINE WORKSPACE
18. arcpy.env.workspace = "folder\\" + str(gdb_name) + "ThesisGDB.gdb" #insert fold
er location
19. GDB = "folder\\"+str(gdb_name)+"ThesisGDB.gdb" #insert folder location
20.
21. # Input versions of boundary data from Census Bureau, USGS, etc.
22. pop = "pop"
23. Roads = "Roads_Clip"
24. Rail = "Rail"
25. River = "River"
26.
27. # Clipped versions 1
28. pop_clipper = "pop_clipper"
29. Roads_clipper = "Roads_clipper"
30. Rail_clipper = "Rail_clipper"
31. River_clipper = "River_clipper"
32.
33. # Projected versions
34. pop_Clip_Proj = "pop_Clip_Proj" #final census data for use in code_summary_loop
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Roads_Proj = "Roads_Proj"
Rail_Proj = "Rail_Proj"
River_Proj = "River_Proj"
# Clipped versions 2
Roads_Proj_Clip = "Roads_Proj_Clip"
Rail_Proj_Clip = "Rail_Proj_Clip"
River_Proj_Clip = "River_Proj_Clip"
# Merged versions
RRail_Proj_Clip = "RRail_Proj_Clip"
RRiver_Proj_Clip = "RRiver_Proj_Clip"
RRR_Proj_Clip = "RRR_Proj_Clip"
# Lined versions, final for use in code_summary_loop
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50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Roads_Proj_Line_Clip = "Roads_Proj_Line_Clip"
RRailLine = "RRailLine"
RRiverLine = "RRiverLine"
RRRLine = "RRRLine"

# CLIP TO CLIPPER
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop, clipper, pop_clipper, "")
arcpy.Clip_analysis(Roads, clipper, Roads_clipper, "")
arcpy.Clip_analysis(Rail, clipper, Rail_clipper, "")
arcpy.Clip_analysis(River, clipper, River_clipper, "")
print("clipped to Clipper")
# ENSURE CONSISTENT PROJECTIONS
spatialRef = arcpy.Describe(box).spatialReference
arcpy.Project_management(pop_clipper, pop_Clip_Proj, spatialRef)
arcpy.Project_management(Roads_clipper, Roads_Proj, spatialRef)
arcpy.Project_management(Rail_clipper, Rail_Proj, spatialRef)
arcpy.Project_management(River_clipper, River_Proj, spatialRef)
print("Projected")
# CLIP TO BOX_BUFFER
arcpy.Clip_analysis(Roads_Proj, box_Buffer, Roads_Proj_Clip, "")
arcpy.Clip_analysis(Rail_Proj, box_Buffer, Rail_Proj_Clip, "")
arcpy.Clip_analysis(River_Proj, box_Buffer, River_Proj_Clip, "")
print("clipped to box_Buffer")

# MERGE
arcpy.Merge_management([Roads_Proj_Clip, Rail_Proj_Clip], RRail_Proj_Clip)
arcpy.Merge_management([Roads_Proj_Clip, River_Proj_Clip], RRiver_Proj_Clip)
arcpy.Merge_management([Roads_Proj_Clip, River_Proj_Clip, Rail_Proj_Clip], RRR_P
roj_Clip)
82. print("Merged")
83.
84. # LINE - BREAK LINES AT EVERY INTERSECTION
85. arcpy.FeatureToLine_management(Roads_Proj_Clip, Roads_Proj_Clip_Line)
86. print("Roads Lined")
87. arcpy.FeatureToLine_management(RRail_Proj_Clip, RRailLine)
88. print("RRail Lined")
89. arcpy.FeatureToLine_management(RRiver_Proj_Clip, RRiverLine)
90. print("RRiver Lined")
91. arcpy.FeatureToLine_management(RRR_Proj_Clip, RRRLine)
92. print("RRR Lined")
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A2. Overall Script
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

#
#
#
#
#

--------------------------------------------------------------------------code_summary_loop.py
Micki Sundheim
Updated on: 2016-1-1
Description: Generate hazard zones and calculate area and population affected

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

# Requires module hazardzonesm.py
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------import
import
import
import
import

arcpy
math
numpy
random
sys

import hazardzonesm
## USER INPUT VARIABLES
#wdir = 45 #Chicago
wdir = 0
#Denver
#wdir = 315 #Houston
loc = 'Denver' #city name
wdir = int(wdir)
numpoints = 50 #number of random points to be generated per region
min = 0 #minimum distance between random points
mindist = str(min) + " Meters" #add units
gdb_name = 'CO'

#State designation

## DEFINE WORKSPACE
arcpy.env.workspace = "folder\\" + str(gdb_name) + "ThesisGDB.gdb" #input folder
location
31. GDB = "folder\\"+str(gdb_name)+"ThesisGDB.gdb" #input folder location
32.
33. # DEFINE VARIABLES
34. box = "box"
35. spills = "CO_spills"
36. name = str(spills)
37. pop_Clip_Proj = "pop_Clip_Proj"
38.
39. Spill_Location_Buffer3 = "Spill_Location_Buffer3"
40. Clip_IsoZone = "Clip_IsoZone"
41. Downwind_Zone = "Downwind_Zone"
42. Downwind_Zone_dissolve = "Downwind_Zone_dissolve"
43. eraseDZone = "eraseDZone"
44. Clip_DZone = "Clip_DZone"
45. Clip_DZone_Statistics = "Clip_DZone_Statistics"
46. Clip_IsoZone_Stats = "Clip_IsoZone_Stats"
47. Stats = "Statistics_" + str(loc)
48.
49. RoadsLine = "Roads_Proj_Line_Clip"
50. RoadsRailLine = "RRailLine"
51. RoadsRiverLine = "RRiverLine"
52. RRRLine = "RRRLine"
53.
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54. NewIsoZone = "New_IsoZone"
55. NewIsoZone_whole = "NewIsoZone_whole"
56. Isovert = "Isovert"
57. poly = "All_Polygons"
58. dpoly = "All_DPolygons"
59. New_eraseDZone = "New_eraseDZone"
60. New_eraseDZone_whole = "New_eraseDZone_whole"
61. Dvert = "Dvert"
62. Clip_NewIsoZone = "Clip_NewIsoZone"
63. Clip_NewDZone = "Clip_NewDZone"
64. New_Stats = "Statistics_NewZone_" + str(loc)
65. NewDZone_Stats = "NewDZone_Stats"
66.
67. spatialRef = arcpy.Describe(box).spatialReference
68.
69. # DELETE STUFF
70. if arcpy.Exists(spills):
71.
arcpy.Delete_management(spills)
72. if arcpy.Exists(Spill_Location_Buffer3):
73.
arcpy.Delete_management(Spill_Location_Buffer3)
74. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_IsoZone):
75.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone)
76. if arcpy.Exists(Downwind_Zone):
77.
arcpy.Delete_management(Downwind_Zone)
78. if arcpy.Exists(Downwind_Zone_dissolve):
79.
arcpy.Delete_management(Downwind_Zone_dissolve)
80. if arcpy.Exists(eraseDZone):
81.
arcpy.Delete_management(eraseDZone)
82. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_DZone):
83.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone)
84. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_IsoZone_Stats):
85.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone_Stats)
86. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_DZone_Statistics):
87.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone_Statistics)
88. if arcpy.Exists(Stats):
89.
arcpy.Delete_management(Stats)
90.
91. if arcpy.Exists(NewIsoZone):
92.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewIsoZone)
93. if arcpy.Exists(NewIsoZone_whole):
94.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewIsoZone_whole)
95. if arcpy.Exists(Isovert):
96.
arcpy.Delete_management(Isovert)
97. if arcpy.Exists(poly):
98.
arcpy.Delete_management(poly)
99. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_NewIsoZone):
100.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_NewIsoZone)
101. if arcpy.Exists(dpoly):
102.
arcpy.Delete_management(dpoly)
103. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_NewDZone):
104.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_NewDZone)
105. if arcpy.Exists(New_eraseDZone):
106.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone)
107. if arcpy.Exists(New_eraseDZone_whole):
108.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone_whole)
109. if arcpy.Exists(Dvert):
110.
arcpy.Delete_management(Dvert)
111. if arcpy.Exists(New_Stats):
112.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_Stats)
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113. if arcpy.Exists(NewDZone_Stats):
114.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewDZone_Stats)
115.
116.
117. # DEFINE HAZARD DISTANCES
118. #assign hazards to number
119. H = {'Anhydrous Ammonia':0, 'Chlorine':1, 'Sulfur_Dioxide':2, 'VX':3, 'GB':4, 'R
DD':5}
120.
121. #define hazard distances
122. Iso_dist = [125, 1000, 1000, 60, 400, 250]
123. DW_dist = [500, 3500, 7600, 400, 2100, 2000]
124.
125. # GENERATE RANDOM POINTS WITHIN BOX
126. hazardzonesm.randompts(box, numpoints, GDB, spatialRef, min, name)
127. print('points created')
128.
129. # ADD XY GEOMETRY TO ATTRIBUTE TABLE OF SPILLS
130. arcpy.AddXY_management(spills)
131.
132. # ADD ORIGINAL SHAPE AREAS TO CENSUS DATA
133. #Add Field to store original shape areas
134. arcpy.AddField_management(pop_Clip_Proj, "Orig_Area2", "FLOAT", "", "", "", "",
"NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
135.
136. #Calculate Field of original shape areas
137. arcpy.CalculateField_management(pop_Clip_Proj, "Orig_Area2", "[Shape_area]", "VB
", "")
138.
139. # CREATE TABLE TO STORE STATISTICS
140. arcpy.CreateTable_management(GDB, Stats)
141. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "FREQUENCY", "LONG")
142. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "SUM_Pop_Affected", "DOUBLE")
143. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "SUM_Area_Affected", "DOUBLE")
144. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Hazard", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "
NON_REQUIRED", "")
145. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Zone", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "NO
N_REQUIRED", "")
146. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Std_New", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE",
"NON_REQUIRED", "")
147. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Environment", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NULL
ABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
148. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "City", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "NO
N_REQUIRED", "")
149. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Point_num", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NULLAB
LE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
150. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Vertices", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NULLABL
E", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
151. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Boundary_Set", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLAB
LE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
152. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Pop_diff", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE
", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
153. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Area_diff", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULLABL
E", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
154. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Pop_diff_per", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULL
ABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
155. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Area_diff_per", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NUL
LABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
156.
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157. print('Stats table created')
158. lost = 0
159. lost_pt = []
160. lost_hz = []
161.
162. ## FOR EACH HAZARD:
163. i = 0
164. while i < 6:
165.
print('Hazard: ' + str(i))
166.
167.
#assign appropriate distance variables
168.
isodist = Iso_dist[i]
169.
dist = DW_dist[i]
170.
171.
## FOR EACH POINT:
172.
points = arcpy.SearchCursor(spills)
173.
for point in points:
174.
175.
p = point.OBJECTID
176.
envir = point.PolygonOID
177.
print('Hazard: ' + str(i))
178.
print('point: ' + str(p))
179.
180.
# MAKE FEATURE LAYER
181.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(spills, "spills_lyr")
182.
# SELECT POINT IN POINTS
183.
arcpy.SelectLayerByAttribute_management("spills_lyr","NEW_SELECTION", '"
OBJECTID" = %d' % point.OBJECTID)
184.
185.
# BUFFER AND CLIP INITIAL ISOLATION ZONE
186.
#Buffer for initial isolation zone at hazard distance
187.
arcpy.Buffer_analysis("spills_lyr", Spill_Location_Buffer3, isodist, "FU
LL", "ROUND", "NONE", "")
188.
189.
#Clip block data by isolation zone
190.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, Spill_Location_Buffer3, Clip_IsoZone,
"")
191.
192.
Bound = 'NA' #Standard zones
193.
194.
# Count the lines intersecting the IsoZone
195.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(RRRLine, "bound_lyr")
196.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("bound_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTL
INE_OF", Spill_Location_Buffer3, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
197.
isovert1 = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("bound_lyr").getOutput(0))
198.
199.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT IN
TABLE
200.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_IsoZone, Clip_IsoZone_Stats, 'Initial Isolation'
, Stats, i, loc, 'Standard', envir, p, isovert1, Bound)
201.
202.
#Append to stats table
203.
arcpy.Append_management(Clip_IsoZone_Stats, Stats)
204.
205.
sc = arcpy.da.SearchCursor(Clip_IsoZone_Stats, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM
_Area_Affected'])
206.
for row in sc:
207.
isopop1 = row[0]
208.
isoarea1 = row[1]
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209.
210.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone_Stats)
211.
del sc
212.
213.
# CREATE FEATURE CLASS FOR DOWNWIND ZONE
214.
arcpy.CreateFeatureclass_management(GDB, "Downwind_Zone", "POLYGON", spi
lls, "DISABLED", "DISABLED", spatialRef, "", "0", "0", "0")
215.
216.
# MAKE DOWNWIND ZONE
217.
#Read point geometry of spill location, create rectangle, create extra b
uffer if RDD, erase initial isolation area
218.
hazardzonesm.rectangle("spills_lyr", dist, isodist, wdir, spatialRef, i,
Downwind_Zone, Spill_Location_Buffer3, eraseDZone, Clip_IsoZone, Downwind_Zone_
dissolve)
219.
220.
# CLIP CENSUS DATA WITH DOWNWIND ZONE
221.
#Clip rectangle to get census block layer within downwind-only zone
222.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, eraseDZone, Clip_DZone, "")
223.
224.
# Count the lines that intersect the zone
225.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("bound_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTL
INE_OF", eraseDZone, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
226.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("bound_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTL
INE_OF", Spill_Location_Buffer3, "", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
227.
dvert1 = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("bound_lyr").getOutput(0))
228.
vert = isovert1 + dvert1 #add initial isolation and protection action i
ntersections
229.
230.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT IN
TABLE*
231.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_DZone, Clip_DZone_Statistics, 'Protective Action
', Stats, i, loc, 'Standard', envir, p, vert, Bound)
232.
233.
#Append to stats table
234.
arcpy.Append_management(Clip_DZone_Statistics, Stats)
235.
236.
sc = arcpy.da.SearchCursor(Clip_DZone_Statistics, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', '
SUM_Area_Affected'])
237.
for row in sc:
238.
dpop1 = row[0]
239.
darea1 = row[1]
240.
241.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone_Statistics)
242.
del sc
243.
244.
##########################
245.
# NEW HAZARD ZONES MATCHED TO PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES #
246.
b=0
247.
while b < 4:
#for each boundary set
248.
249.
#Use the associated boundary set shapefile
250.
if b == 0:
251.
Bounds = RoadsLine
252.
Bound = 'R'
253.
elif b == 1:
254.
Bounds = RoadsRailLine
255.
Bound = 'RRail'
256.
elif b == 2:
257.
Bounds = RoadsRiverLine
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258.
Bound = 'RRiver'
259.
else:
260.
Bounds = RRRLine
261.
Bound = 'RRR'
262.
263.
# Make feature layers, select by location the lines around standard
initial iso zone
264.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(Bounds, "road_lyr")
265.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(Spill_Location_Buffer3, "buff_lyr"
)
266.
267.
distance = 15000 # distance for buffer to select
268.
unit = str(distance) + " Meters" #add units
269.
270.
# Select Layer By Location - lines that surround the standard zone
271.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN_A_DISTANC
E", "buff_lyr", unit, "NEW_SELECTION")
272.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_O
UTLINE_OF", "buff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
273.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN", "buff_l
yr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
274.
275.
# Turn everything into polygons
276.
arcpy.FeatureToPolygon_management("road_lyr", poly)
277.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(poly, "poly_lyr")
278.
279.
# Select the feature that contains the buffer
280.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("poly_lyr", "CONTAINS", "buff
_lyr","", "NEW_SELECTION")
281.
282.
# Eliminate holes
283.
arcpy.EliminatePolygonPart_management("poly_lyr", NewIsoZone_whole,
"PERCENT", "0 SquareMeters", "99", "ANY")
284.
285.
# Count the intersections
286.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "SHARE_A_LINE_SEG
MENT_WITH", NewIsoZone_whole, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
287.
isovert = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("road_lyr").getOutput(0))
288.
289.
# Clip block data by new isolation zone
290.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, NewIsoZone_whole, Clip_NewIsoZone
, "")
291.
292.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT
IN TABLE
293.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_NewIsoZone, New_Stats, 'Initial Isolation',
Stats, i, loc, 'New', envir, p, isovert, Bound)
294.
295.
#Append to stats table
296.
arcpy.Append_management(New_Stats, Stats)
297.
298.
sc = arcpy.da.SearchCursor(New_Stats, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM_Area
_Affected'])
299.
for row in sc:
300.
isopop2 = row[0]
301.
isoarea2 = row[1]
302.
303.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_Stats)
304.
del sc
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305.
306.
## NEW DOWNWIND ZONE ##
307.
308.
# Make feature layer, select by location around downwind zone
309.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(eraseDZone, "dbuff_lyr")
310.
311.
distance = 15000 # distance for buffer to select
312.
unit = str(distance) + " Meters" #add units
313.
314.
# Select Layer By Location - lines that surround the standard zone
315.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN_A_DISTANC
E", "dbuff_lyr", unit, "NEW_SELECTION")
316.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_O
UTLINE_OF", "dbuff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
317.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN", "dbuff_
lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
318.
319.
# Turn everything into polygons
320.
arcpy.FeatureToPolygon_management("road_lyr", dpoly)
321.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(dpoly, "dpoly_lyr")
322.
323.
# Select the feature that contains the downwind zone
324.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("dpoly_lyr", "CONTAINS", "dbu
ff_lyr","", "NEW_SELECTION")
325.
326.
# Eliminate holes
327.
arcpy.EliminatePolygonPart_management("dpoly_lyr", New_eraseDZone, "
PERCENT", "0 SquareMeters", "99", "ANY")
328.
329.
# Check if New_eraseDZone has any features
330.
k = 0
331.
with arcpy.da.SearchCursor(New_eraseDZone, ['Orig_FID']) as sc:
332.
for row in sc:
333.
k = k + 1
#count rows
334.
del sc
335.
336.
if k == 0:
#if no rows, then try again with bigger buffer
337.
arcpy.Delete_management("dbuff_lyr")
338.
arcpy.Delete_management("dpoly_lyr")
339.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone)
340.
arcpy.Delete_management(dpoly)
341.
342.
lost = lost + 1
#track info about lost PAZs
343.
lost_pt.append(p)
344.
lost_hz.append(i)
345.
346.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(eraseDZone, "dbuff_lyr")
347.
348.
distance = 40000 # extra distance for buffer to select
349.
unit = str(distance) + " Meters" #add units
350.
351.
# Select Layer By Location lines that surround the standard zone
352.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN_A_DIS
TANCE", "dbuff_lyr", unit, "NEW_SELECTION")
353.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_T
HE_OUTLINE_OF", "dbuff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
354.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN", "db
uff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
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355.
356.
# Turn everything into polygons
357.
arcpy.FeatureToPolygon_management("road_lyr", dpoly)
358.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(dpoly, "dpoly_lyr")
359.
360.
# Select the feature that contains the downwind zone
361.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("dpoly_lyr", "CONTAINS",
"dbuff_lyr","", "NEW_SELECTION")
362.
363.
# Eliminate holes
364.
arcpy.EliminatePolygonPart_management("dpoly_lyr", New_eraseDZon
e, "PERCENT", "0 SquareMeters", "99", "ANY")
365.
366.
# Subtract area in isolation zone that overlaps with downwind area
367.
arcpy.Erase_analysis(New_eraseDZone, Clip_NewIsoZone, New_eraseDZone
_whole)
368.
369.
# Count the intersections
370.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "SHARE_A_LINE_SEG
MENT_WITH", New_eraseDZone_whole, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
371.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "SHARE_A_LINE_SEG
MENT_WITH", NewIsoZone_whole, "", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
372.
dvert = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("road_lyr").getOutput(0))
373.
vert = isovert + dvert #Add new iso and protective action intersect
ions
374.
375.
# Clip census data by new protective action zone
376.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, New_eraseDZone_whole, Clip_NewDZo
ne, "")
377.
378.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT
IN TABLE
379.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_NewDZone, NewDZone_Stats, 'Protective Action
', Stats, i, loc, 'New', envir, p, vert, Bound)
380.
381.
# Read area and pop values from NewDZone_Stats if they exist
382.
j = 0
383.
with arcpy.da.SearchCursor(NewDZone_Stats, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM
_Area_Affected']) as sc:
384.
for row in sc:
385.
dpop2 = row[0]
386.
darea2 = row[1]
387.
j = j + 1
#count rows
388.
389.
if j == 0:
#if no rows, then add data
390.
dpop2 = 0
#assign dpop2 and darea2 as zero
391.
darea2 = 0
392.
393.
fields = ['FREQUENCY','SUM_Pop_Affected','SUM_Area_Affected','Ha
zard','Zone','Std_New','Environment','City','Point_num','Vertices','Boundary_Set
',
394.
'Pop_diff','Area_diff','Pop_diff_per','Area_diff_per']
395.
Incur = arcpy.da.InsertCursor(NewDZone_Stats, fields)
row with variables and 0s for pop and area
396.
popdiff = math.ceil(isopop2 (dpop1+isopop1)) #round up to nearest integer
397.
areadiff = isoarea2 - (darea1+isoarea1)
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#insert

398.

pop_per = ((isopop2 (dpop1+isopop1))/(dpop1+isopop1+1)) * 100 #calculate population percent differ
ence
399.
if darea1+isoarea1 == 0: #double check to avoid dividing by zer
o
400.
areaper = -2
401.
else:
402.
areaper = ((isoarea2 (darea1+isoarea1))/(darea1+isoarea1)) * 100 #calculate area percent difference
403.
404.
#Insert new row with data
405.
newrow = [0,0,0,str(i),'Protective Action','New',envir,loc,p,iso
vert,Bound,popdiff,areadiff,pop_per,areaper]
406.
Incur.insertRow(newrow)
407.
408.
del Incur
409.
410.
elif j > 0:
#if row exists in NewDZone_Stats:
411.
412.
pop_per = ((dpop2+isopop2 (dpop1+isopop1))/(dpop1+isopop1+1)) * 100 #calculate pop percent difference
413.
if darea1+isoarea1 == 0:
414.
areaper = -2
415.
elif darea1+isoarea1 > 0:
416.
areaper = ((darea2+isoarea2 (darea1+isoarea1))/(darea1+isoarea1)) * 100 #calculate area percent difference
417.
418.
#Update table with stats
419.
Upcur = arcpy.da.UpdateCursor(NewDZone_Stats, ['Pop_diff','Area_
diff','Pop_diff_per','Area_diff_per', 'Vertices'])
420.
for row in Upcur:
421.
row[0] = math.ceil(dpop2+isopop2 - (dpop1+isopop1))
422.
row[1] = darea2+isoarea2 - (darea1+isoarea1)
423.
row[2] = pop_per
424.
row[3] = areaper
425.
row[4] = isovert + dvert
426.
Upcur.updateRow(row)
427.
del Upcur
428.
429.
#Append to stats table
430.
arcpy.Append_management(NewDZone_Stats, Stats)
431.
432.
#clean up variables
433.
434.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewDZone_Stats)
435.
isopop2 = 0
436.
isoarea2 = 0
437.
dpop2 = 0
438.
darea2 = 0
439.
popdiff = 0
440.
areadiff = 0
441.
pop_per = 0
442.
areaper = 0
443.
444.
isovert = 0
445.
dvert = 0
446.
vert = 0
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447.
448.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewIsoZone)
449.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewIsoZone_whole)
450.
arcpy.Delete_management(Isovert)
451.
arcpy.Delete_management(poly)
452.
arcpy.Delete_management(dpoly)
453.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone)
454.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone_whole)
455.
arcpy.Delete_management(Dvert)
456.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_NewIsoZone)
457.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_NewDZone)
458.
459.
arcpy.Delete_management("road_lyr")
460.
arcpy.Delete_management("buff_lyr")
461.
arcpy.Delete_management("poly_lyr")
462.
arcpy.Delete_management("dbuff_lyr")
463.
arcpy.Delete_management("dpoly_lyr")
464.
arcpy.Delete_management("bound_lyr")
465.
466.
b = b + 1 #next boundary set
467.
print('Bound: ' + Bound)
468.
469.
# DELETE STUFF TO REUSE VARIABLES ON EVERY LOOP
470.
471.
arcpy.Delete_management(Spill_Location_Buffer3)
472.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone)
473.
arcpy.Delete_management(Downwind_Zone)
474.
arcpy.Delete_management(eraseDZone)
475.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone)
476.
477.
isopop1 = 0
478.
isoarea1 = 0
479.
dpop1 = 0
480.
darea1 = 0
481.
isovert1 = 0
482.
dvert1 = 0
483.
484.
del points
485.
del point
486.
487.
i = i + 1 #next hazard
488.
489. #end while
490.
491. print(lost)
492. print(lost_pt)
493. print(lost_hz)
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A3. Hazard Zones Module
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------# hazardzonesm.py
# Micki Sundheim
# Updated on: 2015-12-20
# Description: Module for use with code_summary_loop
# Three functions defined: stats (calculate/add statistics), rectangle (create d
ownwind zone), randompts (generate random points)
7. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------8.
9. import arcpy
10. import math
11. import numpy
12. import random
13. import sys
14.
15. #########################
16. # ADD POP AND AREA DATA
17. def stats(zoneclip, table, zone, Stats, i, city, stdnew, envir, ptnum, vert, bou
nd):
18.
19.
# Add Fields for population and area affected by incident
20.
arcpy.AddField_management(zoneclip, "Pop_Affected", "FLOAT", "", "", "", "",
"NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
21.
arcpy.AddField_management(zoneclip, "Area_Affected", "FLOAT", "", "", "", ""
, "NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
22.
23.
# Calculate Field of population by ratios of area affected for each census b
lock
24.
arcpy.CalculateField_management(zoneclip, "Pop_Affected", "[POP10]* [Shape_a
rea]/ [Orig_Area2]", "VB", "")
25.
26.
# Calculate Field for area affected
27.
arcpy.CalculateField_management(zoneclip, "Area_Affected", "!shape.area@squa
remeters!", "PYTHON", "")
28.
29.
##CALCULATE STATS AND PUT IN TABLE
30.
# Summary Statistics - sum total population and areas affected
31.
arcpy.Statistics_analysis(zoneclip, table, "Pop_Affected SUM;Area_Affected S
UM", "")
32.
# Add Fields for hazard and zone type and other info
33.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Hazard", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE
", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
34.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Zone", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE",
"NON_REQUIRED", "")
35.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Std_New", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABL
E", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
36.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Environment", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "
NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
37.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "City", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE",
"NON_REQUIRED", "")
38.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Point_num", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NU
LLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
39.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Vertices", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NUL
LABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
40.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Boundary_Set", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NU
LLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
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41.

arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Pop_diff", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULL
ABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
42.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Area_diff", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NUL
LABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
43.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Pop_diff_per", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "
NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
44.
arcpy.AddField_management(table, "Area_diff_per", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "",
"NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
45.
46.
# Fill in new fields
47.
fields = ["Hazard","Zone","Std_New","Environment","City","Point_num","Vertic
es","Boundary_Set","Pop_diff","Area_diff"]
48.
Upcur = arcpy.da.UpdateCursor(table, fields)
49.
for row in Upcur:
50.
51.
row[0] = str(i)
52.
row[1] = zone
53.
row[2] = stdnew
54.
row[3] = envir
55.
row[4] = city
56.
row[5] = ptnum
57.
row[6] = vert
58.
row[7] = bound
59.
60.
#Insert place holders for pop and area diff
61.
if stdnew == 'New':
62.
if zone == 'Protective Action':
63.
row[8] = 0
64.
row[9] = 0
65.
66.
else:
67.
row[8] = -1
68.
row[9] = -1
69.
70.
else:
71.
row[8] = -1
72.
row[9] = -1
73.
74.
Upcur.updateRow(row)
75.
del Upcur
76.
77.
print(stdnew + ' ' + zone + " zone complete")
78.
arcpy.AddMessage(stdnew + ' ' + zone + ' zone complete')
79.
80.
return
81.
82. ###################
83. # CREATE DOWNWIND ZONE
84. def rectangle(Spill_Location, dist, isodist, wdir, spatialRef, i, Downwind_Zone,
Spill_Location_Buffer3, eraseDZone, Clip_IsoZone, Downwind_Zone_dissolve):
85.
86.
# Read point geometry of Spill_Location
87.
rows = arcpy.SearchCursor(Spill_Location)
88.
for row in rows:
89.
spillx = row.getValue("POINT_X")
90.
spilly = row.getValue("POINT_Y")
91.
del row, rows
92.
93.
# Define coordinates of rectangle zone about origin
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94.
theta = (wdir - 90) * math.pi/180
95.
96.
# If RDD, calculate different rectangle
97.
if i == 5:
98.
#top left
99.
topl = numpy.array([[0], [dist/4], [1]])
100.
#top right
101.
topr = numpy.array([[dist], [dist/4], [1]])
102.
#bottom left
103.
botl = numpy.array([[0], [-dist/4], [1]])
104.
#bottom right
105.
botr = numpy.array([[dist], [-dist/4], [1]])
106.
107.
# For the rest of the hazards:
108.
else:
109.
topl = numpy.array([[0], [dist/2], [1]])
110.
topr = numpy.array([[dist], [dist/2], [1]])
111.
botl = numpy.array([[0], [-dist/2], [1]])
112.
botr = numpy.array([[dist], [-dist/2], [1]])
113.
114.
# Rotate coordinates by wind direction
115.
R = numpy.array([[math.cos(theta), math.sin(theta), spillx], [math.sin(theta), math.cos(theta), spilly]]) #rotation matrix
116.
topl = numpy.dot(R,topl) #top left
117.
topr = numpy.dot(R,topr) #top right
118.
botl = numpy.dot(R,botl) #bottom left
119.
botr = numpy.dot(R,botr) #bottom right
120.
121.
# Make a new empty array
122.
array = arcpy.Array()
123.
124.
# Make coordinates points
125.
point1 = arcpy.Point(float(topl[0]), float(topl[1]))
126.
point2 = arcpy.Point(float(topr[0]), float(topr[1]))
127.
point3 = arcpy.Point(float(botr[0]), float(botr[1]))
128.
point4 = arcpy.Point(float(botl[0]), float(botl[1]))
129.
130.
# Put the points in the array
131.
array.add(point1)
132.
array.add(point2)
133.
array.add(point3)
134.
array.add(point4)
135.
136.
# Make a polygon out of the array
137.
rectangle = arcpy.Polygon(array, spatialRef)
138.
cursor = arcpy.da.InsertCursor(Downwind_Zone, ["SHAPE@"])
139.
cursor.insertRow([rectangle])
140.
141.
# Add extra buffer around hot zone for RDD
142.
if i == 5:
143.
pntGeom = arcpy.PointGeometry(arcpy.Point(spillx, spilly)) #center of ci
rcle
144.
circle = pntGeom.buffer(isodist * 2)
145.
cursor.insertRow([circle])
146.
del cursor
147.
arcpy.Dissolve_management(Downwind_Zone, Downwind_Zone_dissolve) #dissol
ve buffer and downwind zones
148.
#subtract area in hot zone: erase
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149.
arcpy.Erase_analysis(Downwind_Zone_dissolve, Spill_Location_Buffer3, era
seDZone)
150.
arcpy.Delete_management(Downwind_Zone_dissolve)
151.
else:
152.
del cursor
153.
#subtract area in isolation zone: erase
154.
arcpy.Erase_analysis(Downwind_Zone, Spill_Location_Buffer3, eraseDZone)
155.
156.
# Clean stuff up to reuse feature layers and tables
157.
arcpy.Delete_management("spills_lyr")
158.
159.
del R, array
160.
161.
return
162.
163. ########################
164. # GENERATE RANDOM POINTS IN POLYGONS
165. # Adapted from Ian Broad, http://ianbroad.com/arcgis-toolbox-generate-randompoints-arcpy/
166. def randompts(box, numpoints, GDB, spatialRef, min, name):
167.
168.
# Determine number of polygons in box feature class (number of regions)
169.
result = arcpy.GetCount_management(box)
170.
features = int(result.getOutput(0))
171.
172.
# Initialize counter values
173.
attempts = 1000
174.
keep_attempts = 'NO'
175.
176.
# Create point feature class for spill locations
177.
spills = arcpy.CreateFeatureclass_management(GDB, str(name), "POINT", "", "D
ISABLED", "DISABLED", spatialRef)
178.
arcpy.AddField_management(spills, "PolygonOID", "TEXT")
179.
180.
# Read extent of box
181.
fields = ["SHAPE@", "OID@"]
182.
with arcpy.da.SearchCursor(box, (fields)) as rows:
183.
for row in rows:
184.
oid = row[1]
185.
polygon_geom = row[0]
186.
distance = []
187.
188.
xmin, xmax= row[0].extent.XMin, row[0].extent.XMax
189.
ymin, ymax = row[0].extent.YMin, row[0].extent.YMax
190.
191.
i = 0
192.
attempt = 1
193.
194.
# Create random points
195.
with arcpy.da.InsertCursor(spills, ("SHAPE@", "PolygonOID")) as inse
rt:
196.
197.
while i < numpoints: #for i number of points
198.
xcoord = random.uniform(xmin, xmax)
199.
ycoord = random.uniform(ymin, ymax)
200.
201.
point = arcpy.Point(xcoord, ycoord) #create point from coor
dinates
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202.
point_geom = arcpy.PointGeometry(point, polygon_geom.spatial
Reference)
203.
contains_point = polygon_geom.contains(point_geom) #check i
f point is within polygon box
204.
205.
if attempt < attempts: #control number of attempts in case
conditions can't be met
206.
if contains_point == True and i == 0: #put first good p
oint in feature class
207.
distance.append(point_geom)
208.
insert.insertRow((point_geom, oid))
209.
i = i + 1
210.
211.
elif contains_point == True and i > 0: #subsequent poin
ts in box
212.
distance_check = True
213.
for point in distance: #check minimum distance crit
erion against each existing point
214.
if point_geom.distanceTo(point) > min:
215.
pass
216.
else: #if doesn't pass distance criterion,
then increment attempt
217.
distance_check = False
218.
attempt = attempt + 1
219.
220.
if distance_check == True: #if point passes distanc
e criteria for all existing points, then add to feature class
221.
distance.append(point_geom)
222.
insert.insertRow((point_geom, oid))
223.
i = i + 1
224.
225.
#if attempts exceeded, then break while loop and print error
message
226.
else:
227.
print('Failed attempting to generate {0} random points f
or Polygon OID: {1}'.format(attempts, oid))
228.
print('Decrease number of random points or the minimum d
istance and try again.')
229.
arcpy.AddError("Failed attempting to generate {0} random
points for Polygon OID: {1}".format(attempts, oid))
230.
arcpy.AddError("Decrease number of random points or the
minimum distance and try again.")
231.
i = numpoints
232.
233.
return
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Appendix B: Python Script for Custom ArcGIS® Tool
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

# --------------------------------------------------------------------------# code_summary_loop_Tool.py
# Micki Sundheim
# Updated on: 2015-2-11
# Description: Custom ArcGIS tool to generate hazard zones and calculate area an
d population affected for a specific incident
6. # Requires module hazardzonesm.py
7. # Tool must also be set up in ArcMap to use script
8. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------9.
10. import arcpy
11. import math
12. import numpy
13. import random
14. import sys
15.
16. import hazardzonesm
17.
18. ## USER INPUT VARIABLES: hazard types, wind direction, name of city, save locati
on, spill location, census data
19. # User must have/create shapefile with spill location, population shapefile, roa
ds/etc. shapefile
20. hazard = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(0)
21. wdir = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(1)
22. loc = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(2)
23. wdir = int(wdir)
24. #gdb_name = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(3)
25. GDB = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(3)
26. spills = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(4)
27. pop_Clip_Proj = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(5)
28. RRRLine = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(6)
29.
30. ## DEFINE WORKSPACE
31. arcpy.env.workspace = GDB #input folder location
32. #GDB = "folder\\"+str(gdb_name)+"ThesisGDB.gdb" #input folder location
33.
34. # DEFINE VARIABLES
35. Spill_Location_Buffer3 = "Spill_Location_Buffer3"
36. Clip_IsoZone = "Clip_IsoZone"
37. Downwind_Zone = "Downwind_Zone"
38. Downwind_Zone_dissolve = "Downwind_Zone_dissolve"
39. eraseDZone = "eraseDZone"
40. Clip_DZone = "Clip_DZone"
41. Clip_DZone_Statistics = "Clip_DZone_Statistics"
42. Clip_IsoZone_Stats = "Clip_IsoZone_Stats"
43. Stats = "ToolStatistics_" + str(loc)
44.
45. NewIsoZone = "New_IsoZone"
46. NewIsoZone_whole = "NewIsoZone_whole"
47. Isovert = "Isovert"
48. poly = "All_Polygons"
49. dpoly = "All_DPolygons"
50. New_eraseDZone = "New_eraseDZone"
51. New_eraseDZone_whole = "New_eraseDZone_whole"
52. Dvert = "Dvert"
53. Clip_NewIsoZone = "Clip_NewIsoZone"
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54. Clip_NewDZone = "Clip_NewDZone"
55. New_Stats = "Statistics_NewZone_" + str(loc)
56. NewDZone_Stats = "NewDZone_Stats"
57.
58. spatialRef = arcpy.Describe(spills).spatialReference
59.
60. # DELETE STUFF
61. if arcpy.Exists(Spill_Location_Buffer3):
62.
arcpy.Delete_management(Spill_Location_Buffer3)
63. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_IsoZone):
64.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone)
65. if arcpy.Exists(Downwind_Zone):
66.
arcpy.Delete_management(Downwind_Zone)
67. if arcpy.Exists(Downwind_Zone_dissolve):
68.
arcpy.Delete_management(Downwind_Zone_dissolve)
69. if arcpy.Exists(eraseDZone):
70.
arcpy.Delete_management(eraseDZone)
71. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_DZone):
72.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone)
73. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_IsoZone_Stats):
74.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone_Stats)
75. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_DZone_Statistics):
76.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone_Statistics)
77. if arcpy.Exists(Stats):
78.
arcpy.Delete_management(Stats)
79. if arcpy.Exists(Stats):
80.
arcpy.Delete_management(Stats)
81.
82. if arcpy.Exists(NewIsoZone):
83.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewIsoZone)
84. if arcpy.Exists(NewIsoZone_whole):
85.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewIsoZone_whole)
86. if arcpy.Exists(Isovert):
87.
arcpy.Delete_management(Isovert)
88. if arcpy.Exists(poly):
89.
arcpy.Delete_management(poly)
90. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_NewIsoZone):
91.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_NewIsoZone)
92. if arcpy.Exists(dpoly):
93.
arcpy.Delete_management(dpoly)
94. if arcpy.Exists(Clip_NewDZone):
95.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_NewDZone)
96. if arcpy.Exists(New_eraseDZone):
97.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone)
98. if arcpy.Exists(New_eraseDZone_whole):
99.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone_whole)
100. if arcpy.Exists(Dvert):
101.
arcpy.Delete_management(Dvert)
102. if arcpy.Exists(New_Stats):
103.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_Stats)
104. if arcpy.Exists(NewDZone_Stats):
105.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewDZone_Stats)
106.
107. # DEFINE HAZARD DISTANCES
108. #assign hazards to number
109. H = {'Anhydrous Ammonia':0, 'Chlorine':1, 'Sulfur Dioxide':2, 'VX':3, 'GB':4, 'R
DD':5}
110.
111. #define hazard distances
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112. Iso_dist = [125, 1000, 1000, 60, 400, 250]
113. DW_dist = [300, 2900, 5100, 300, 4900, 2000]
114.
115. #assign appropriate distance variables
116. i = H[hazard]
117. isodist = Iso_dist[i]
118. dist = DW_dist[i]
119. arcpy.AddMessage('Hazard: ' + str(hazard) + "\n" 'Initial Isolation Distance: '
+ str(isodist) + ' meters' + "\n" 'Protective Action Distance: ' + str(dist) + '
meters')
120.
121. # ADD XY GEOMETRY TO ATTRIBUTE TABLE OF SPILL_LOCATION
122. arcpy.AddXY_management(spills)
123.
124. # ADD ORIGINAL SHAPE AREAS TO CENSUS DATA
125. #Add Field to store original shape areas
126. arcpy.AddField_management(pop_Clip_Proj, "Orig_Area2", "FLOAT", "", "", "", "",
"NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
127.
128. #Calculate Field of original shape areas
129. arcpy.CalculateField_management(pop_Clip_Proj, "Orig_Area2", "[Shape_area]", "VB
", "")
130.
131. # CREATE TABLE TO STORE STATISTICS
132. arcpy.CreateTable_management(GDB, Stats)
133. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "FREQUENCY", "LONG")
134. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "SUM_Pop_Affected", "DOUBLE")
135. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "SUM_Area_Affected", "DOUBLE")
136. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Hazard", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "
NON_REQUIRED", "")
137. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Zone", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "NO
N_REQUIRED", "")
138. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Std_New", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE",
"NON_REQUIRED", "")
139. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Environment", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NULL
ABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
140. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "City", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "NO
N_REQUIRED", "")
141. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Point_num", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NULLAB
LE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
142. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Vertices", "INTEGER", "", "", "", "", "NULLABL
E", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
143. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Boundary_Set", "TEXT", "", "", "", "", "NULLAB
LE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
144. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Pop_diff", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULLABLE
", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
145. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Area_diff", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULLABL
E", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
146. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Pop_diff_per", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NULL
ABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
147. arcpy.AddField_management(Stats, "Area_diff_per", "DOUBLE", "", "", "", "", "NUL
LABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "")
148.
149. arcpy.AddMessage('Stats table created')
150.
151. lost = 0
152. lost_pt = []
153. lost_hz = []
154.
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155. isopop2 = 0
156. isoarea2 = 0
157. dpop2 = 0
158. darea2 = 0
159. popdiff = 0
160. areadiff = 0
161. pop_per = 0
162. areaper = 0
163.
164. isovert = 0
165. dvert = 0
166. vert = 0
167.
168. isopop1 = 0
169. isoarea1 = 0
170. dpop1 = 0
171. darea1 = 0
172. isovert1 = 0
173. dvert1 = 0
174.
175. ## FOR SPILL POINT:
176. points = arcpy.SearchCursor(spills)
177. for point in points:
178.
179.
p = point.OBJECTID
180.
envir = 0
181.
182.
# MAKE FEATURE LAYER
183.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(spills, "spills_lyr")
184.
# SELECT POINT IN POINTS
185.
arcpy.SelectLayerByAttribute_management("spills_lyr","NEW_SELECTION", '"OBJE
CTID" = %d' % point.OBJECTID)
186.
187.
# BUFFER AND CLIP INITIAL ISOLATION ZONE
188.
#Buffer for initial isolation zone at distance in spill location attribute t
able
189.
arcpy.Buffer_analysis("spills_lyr", Spill_Location_Buffer3, isodist, "FULL",
"ROUND", "NONE", "")
190.
191.
#Clip block data by isolation zone
192.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, Spill_Location_Buffer3, Clip_IsoZone, "")
193.
194.
Bound = 'NA'
195.
196.
# Count the lines intersecting the IsoZone
197.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(RRRLine, "bound_lyr")
198.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("bound_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTLINE_
OF", Spill_Location_Buffer3, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
199.
isovert1 = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("bound_lyr").getOutput(0))
200.
201.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT IN TABL
E*
202.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_IsoZone, Clip_IsoZone_Stats, 'Initial Isolation', St
ats, i, loc, 'Standard', envir, p, isovert1, Bound)
203.
204.
#append to stats table
205.
arcpy.Append_management(Clip_IsoZone_Stats, Stats)
206.
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207.
sc = arcpy.da.SearchCursor(Clip_IsoZone_Stats, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM_Are
a_Affected'])
208.
for row in sc:
209.
isopop1 = row[0]
210.
isoarea1 = row[1]
211.
212.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_IsoZone_Stats)
213.
del sc
214.
215.
# CREATE FEATURE CLASS FOR DOWNWIND ZONE
216.
arcpy.CreateFeatureclass_management(GDB, "Downwind_Zone", "POLYGON", spills,
"DISABLED", "DISABLED", spatialRef, "", "0", "0", "0")
217.
218.
# MAKE DOWNWIND ZONE
219.
#read point geometry of spill location, create rectangle, create extra buffe
r if RDD, erase initial isolation area**
220.
hazardzonesm.rectangle("spills_lyr", dist, isodist, wdir, spatialRef, i, Dow
nwind_Zone, Spill_Location_Buffer3, eraseDZone, Clip_IsoZone, Downwind_Zone_diss
olve)
221.
222.
# CLIP CENSUS DATA WITH DOWNWIND ZONE**
223.
#clip rectangle to get census block layer within downwind-only zone
224.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, eraseDZone, Clip_DZone, "")
225.
226.
# Count the lines that intersect the zone
227.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("bound_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTLINE_
OF", eraseDZone, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
228.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("bound_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTLINE_
OF", Spill_Location_Buffer3, "", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
229.
dvert1 = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("bound_lyr").getOutput(0))
230.
vert = isovert1 + dvert1 #add initial isolation and protection action inter
sections
231.
232.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT IN TABL
E*
233.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_DZone, Clip_DZone_Statistics, 'Protective Action', S
tats, i, loc, 'Standard', envir, p, vert, Bound)
234.
235.
#append to stats table
236.
arcpy.Append_management(Clip_DZone_Statistics, Stats)
237.
238.
sc = arcpy.da.SearchCursor(Clip_DZone_Statistics, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM_
Area_Affected'])
239.
for row in sc:
240.
dpop1 = row[0]
241.
darea1 = row[1]
242.
243.
arcpy.Delete_management(Clip_DZone_Statistics)
244.
del sc
245.
246.
##########################
247.
# NEW HAZARD ZONES MATCHED TO PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES #
248.
Bounds = RRRLine
249.
Bound = 'User Input'
250.
251.
# Make feature layers, select by location the lines around standard initial
iso zone
252.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(Bounds, "road_lyr")
253.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(Spill_Location_Buffer3, "buff_lyr")
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254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

distance = 15000 # distance for buffer to select
unit = str(distance) + " Meters" #add units

# Select Layer By Location lines that cross the boundary of the circle buffer
259.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN_A_DISTANCE", "buf
f_lyr", unit, "NEW_SELECTION")
260.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTLINE_O
F", "buff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
261.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN", "buff_lyr","",
"REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
262.
263.
# Turn everything into polygons
264.
arcpy.FeatureToPolygon_management("road_lyr", poly)
265.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(poly, "poly_lyr")
266.
267.
# Select the feature that contains the buffer
268.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("poly_lyr", "CONTAINS", "buff_lyr",""
, "NEW_SELECTION")
269.
270.
# Eliminate holes
271.
arcpy.EliminatePolygonPart_management("poly_lyr", NewIsoZone_whole, "PERCENT
", "0 SquareMeters", "99", "ANY")
272.
273.
# Count the intersections
274.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "SHARE_A_LINE_SEGMENT_WIT
H", NewIsoZone_whole, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
275.
isovert = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("road_lyr").getOutput(0))
276.
277.
# Clip block data by new isolation zone
278.
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, NewIsoZone_whole, Clip_NewIsoZone, "")
279.
280.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT IN TABL
E*
281.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_NewIsoZone, New_Stats, 'Initial Isolation', Stats, i
, loc, 'New', envir, p, vert, Bound)
282.
283.
#append to stats table
284.
arcpy.Append_management(New_Stats, Stats)
285.
286.
sc = arcpy.da.SearchCursor(New_Stats, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM_Area_Affecte
d'])
287.
for row in sc:
288.
isopop2 = row[0]
289.
isoarea2 = row[1]
290.
291.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_Stats)
292.
del sc
293.
294.
## NEW DOWNWIND ZONE ##
295.
296.
# Make feature layer, select by location around downwind zone
297.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(eraseDZone, "dbuff_lyr")
298.
299.
distance = 15000 # distance for buffer to select
300.
unit = str(distance) + " Meters" #add units
301.
302.
# Select Layer By Location - lines that surround the standard zone
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303.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN_A_DISTANCE", "dbu
ff_lyr", unit, "NEW_SELECTION")
304.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTLINE_O
F", "dbuff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
305.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN", "dbuff_lyr","",
"REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
306.
307.
# Turn everything into polygons
308.
arcpy.FeatureToPolygon_management("road_lyr", dpoly)
309.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(dpoly, "dpoly_lyr")
310.
311.
# Select the feature that contains the downwind zone
312.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("dpoly_lyr", "CONTAINS", "dbuff_lyr",
"", "NEW_SELECTION")
313.
314.
# Eliminate holes
315.
arcpy.EliminatePolygonPart_management("dpoly_lyr", New_eraseDZone, "PERCENT"
, "0 SquareMeters", "99", "ANY")
316.
317.
# Check if New_eraseDZone has any features
318.
k = 0
319.
with arcpy.da.SearchCursor(New_eraseDZone, ['Orig_FID']) as sc:
320.
for row in sc:
321.
k = k + 1
#count rows
322.
del sc
323.
324.
if k == 0:
#if no rows, then try again with bigger buffer
325.
arcpy.Delete_management("dbuff_lyr")
326.
arcpy.Delete_management("dpoly_lyr")
327.
arcpy.Delete_management(New_eraseDZone)
328.
arcpy.Delete_management(dpoly)
329.
330.
lost = lost + 1
#track info about lost PAZs
331.
lost_pt.append(p)
332.
lost_hz.append(i)
333.
334.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(eraseDZone, "dbuff_lyr")
335.
336.
distance = 40000 # extra distance for buffer to select
337.
unit = str(distance) + " Meters" #add units
338.
339.
# Select Layer By Location - lines that surround the standard zone
340.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN_A_DISTANCE",
"dbuff_lyr", unit, "NEW_SELECTION")
341.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "CROSSED_BY_THE_OUTLI
NE_OF", "dbuff_lyr","", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
342.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "WITHIN", "dbuff_lyr"
,"", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
343.
344.
# Turn everything into polygons
345.
arcpy.FeatureToPolygon_management("road_lyr", dpoly)
346.
arcpy.MakeFeatureLayer_management(dpoly, "dpoly_lyr")
347.
348.
# Select the feature that contains the downwind zone
349.
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("dpoly_lyr", "CONTAINS", "dbuff_l
yr","", "NEW_SELECTION")
350.
351.
# Eliminate holes
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352.
arcpy.EliminatePolygonPart_management("dpoly_lyr", New_eraseDZone, "PERC
ENT", "0 SquareMeters", "99", "ANY")
353.
354.
# Subtract area in isolation zone that overlaps with downwind area
355.
arcpy.Erase_analysis(New_eraseDZone, Clip_NewIsoZone, New_eraseDZone_whole)
356.
357.
358.
H",
359.
H",
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

# Count the intersections
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "SHARE_A_LINE_SEGMENT_WIT
New_eraseDZone_whole, "", "NEW_SELECTION")
arcpy.SelectLayerByLocation_management("road_lyr", "SHARE_A_LINE_SEGMENT_WIT
NewIsoZone_whole, "", "REMOVE_FROM_SELECTION")
dvert = int(arcpy.GetCount_management("road_lyr").getOutput(0))
vert = isovert + dvert #Add new iso and protective action intersections
# Clip census data by new protective action zone
arcpy.Clip_analysis(pop_Clip_Proj, New_eraseDZone_whole, Clip_NewDZone, "")

365.
366.
# ADD POPULATION AND AREA DATA, CALCULATE SUMMARY STATISTICS AND PUT IN TABL
E*
367.
hazardzonesm.stats(Clip_NewDZone, NewDZone_Stats, 'Protective Action', Stats
, i, loc, 'New', envir, p, vert, Bound)
368.
369.
# Read area and pop values from NewDZone_Stats if they exist
370.
j = 0
371.
with arcpy.da.SearchCursor(NewDZone_Stats, ['SUM_Pop_Affected', 'SUM_Area_Af
fected']) as sc:
372.
for row in sc:
373.
dpop2 = row[0]
374.
darea2 = row[1]
375.
j = j + 1
#count rows
376.
377.
if j == 0:
#if no rows, then add data
378.
dpop2 = 0
#assign dpop2 and darea2 as zero
379.
darea2 = 0
380.
381.
fields = ['FREQUENCY','SUM_Pop_Affected','SUM_Area_Affected','Hazard','Z
one','Std_New','Environment','City','Point_num','Vertices','Boundary_Set',
382.
'Pop_diff','Area_diff','Pop_diff_per','Area_diff_per']
383.
Incur = arcpy.da.InsertCursor(NewDZone_Stats, fields)
#insert row with
variables and 0s for pop and area
384.
popdiff = math.ceil(isopop2 (dpop1+isopop1)) #round up to nearest integer
385.
areadiff = isoarea2 - (darea1+isoarea1)
386.
pop_per = ((isopop2 (dpop1+isopop1))/(dpop1+isopop1+1)) * 100 #calculate population percent differ
ence
387.
388.
if darea1+isoarea1 == 0:
389.
areaper = -2
390.
else:
391.
areaper = ((isoarea2 (darea1+isoarea1))/(darea1+isoarea1)) * 100 #calculate area percent difference
392.
393.
#Insert new row with data
394.
newrow = [0,0,0,str(i),'Protective Action','New',envir,loc,p,isovert,Bou
nd,popdiff,areadiff,pop_per,areaper]
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395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Incur.insertRow(newrow)
del Incur
elif j > 0:

#if row exists in NewDZone_Stats:

pop_per = ((dpop2+isopop2 (dpop1+isopop1))/(dpop1+isopop1+1)) * 100 #calculate pop percent difference
if darea1+isoarea1 == 0:
areaper = -2
elif darea1+isoarea1 > 0:
areaper = ((darea2+isoarea2 (darea1+isoarea1))/(darea1+isoarea1)) * 100 #calculate area percent difference

405.
406.
#Update table with stats
407.
Upcur = arcpy.da.UpdateCursor(NewDZone_Stats, ['Pop_diff','Area_diff','P
op_diff_per','Area_diff_per', 'Vertices'])
408.
for row in Upcur:
409.
row[0] = math.ceil(dpop2+isopop2 - (dpop1+isopop1))
410.
row[1] = darea2+isoarea2 - (darea1+isoarea1)
411.
row[2] = pop_per
412.
row[3] = areaper
413.
row[4] = isovert + dvert
414.
Upcur.updateRow(row)
415.
del Upcur
416.
417.
#append to stats table
418.
arcpy.Append_management(NewDZone_Stats, Stats)
419.
420.
#clean up variables
421.
arcpy.Delete_management(NewDZone_Stats)
422.
423. del points
424. del point
425.
426. arcpy.AddMessage(lost)
427. arcpy.AddMessage(lost_pt)
428. arcpy.AddMessage(lost_hz)
429. arcpy.AddMessage("\n" + 'Population Affected by Standard Zones: ' + str(round(ma
th.ceil(isopop1 + dpop1))))
430. arcpy.AddMessage('Area Affected by Standard Zones: ' + str(round(((isoarea1 + da
rea1)* 3.86102e-7),2)) + ' square miles')
431. arcpy.AddMessage('Population Affected by New Zones: ' + str(round(math.ceil(isop
op2 + dpop2))))
432. arcpy.AddMessage('Area Affected by New Zones: ' + str(round(((isoarea2 + darea2)
* 3.86102e-7),2)) + ' square miles' + "\n")
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